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1501 
“NOT ORDINARILY RELEVANT”: 
BRINGING FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES TO 
THE FEDERAL SENTENCING TABLE 
Abstract: Incarceration results in negative social, psychological, and economic 
impacts on an inmate’s family and dependents. These impacts last well beyond 
the period of incarceration and can cause lifelong challenges. Federal statutes re-
quire courts to consider mitigating factors while calculating a sentence, including 
a defendant’s characteristics. Family ties and responsibilities are considered an 
aspect of a defendant’s characteristics. Yet the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
significantly limit the extent to which courts can use family ties and responsibili-
ties to reduce or alter a defendant’s sentence. This Note first argues that the 
Guidelines should be amended to indicate that courts can consider family ties and 
responsibilities when determining a sentence. This Note then argues that Rule 32 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be amended to require that a 
family impact assessment be incorporated into each presentence investigation re-
port to provide courts with information about a defendant’s family ties and re-
sponsibilities. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, in United States v. Archuleta, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit held that the district court improperly reduced Joseph Archuleta’s 
sentence by taking into consideration his role as the sole caregiver of his two 
minor children and his elderly mother.1 Archuleta indicated there were no al-
ternative caregivers for his family, but the Tenth Circuit found inadequate evi-
dence of this on the record and refused to remand for further evidence.2 Alt-
hough the court acknowledged the difficult facts at hand, it felt constrained by 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ (“Guidelines”) restrictions against using 
family responsibilities to impose a lower sentence.3 Archuleta’s family was left 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See United States v. Archuleta, 128 F.3d 1446, 1447 (10th Cir. 1997). Archuleta was charged 
with being a felon in possession of a firearm and with making false statements to acquire a firearm. 
See id. Under the Guidelines his sentence would have been a term of imprisonment between thirty-
three to forty-one months. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENC-
ING COMM’N 1997) (providing a table with sentence ranges); Archuleta, 128 F.3d at 1447. Instead, the 
district court granted a downward departure to five months in prison, five months under home con-
finement, and three years supervised release due to Archuleta’s family circumstances. See Archuleta, 
128 F.3d at 1447. 
 2 See Archuleta, 128 F.3d at 1450–52 (indicating the absence of facts on the record while stating 
that a departure for family responsibilities was nonetheless inappropriate). 
 3 See id. at 1452 (stating that the Guidelines do not allow sentencing departures, even in circum-
stances that evoke sympathy, unless the circumstances are unusual). Although at the time the Guide-
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out of the sentencing process because the court operated under the limitations 
imposed by the Guidelines.4 This resulted in the imposition of a sentence with-
out adequate information about Archuleta’s family circumstances.5 
Families of inmates experience significant negative impacts when courts 
do not include defendants’ family responsibilities in their sentencing calcula-
tions.6 These impacts are not just emotional, but extend to financial as well as 
long-term psychological and social effects.7 Brought to light in a comprehen-
sive report by the National Research Council in 2014, these unsettling effects 
have made national headlines.8 Congress and the President are now taking 
                                                                                                                           
lines were mandatory, the language used in the now-advisory Guidelines remains essentially the same 
today: “Family ties and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sen-
tence should be outside the applicable guideline range.” See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1997); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
 4 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1997) (stat-
ing that family ties are not ordinarily relevant to sentencing decisions); Rachel King & Katherine 
Norgard, What About Our Families? Using the Impact on Death Row Defendants’ Family Members 
as a Mitigating Factor in Death Penalty Sentencing Hearings, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1119, 1124 
(1999) (describing the families of defendants as invisible during sentencing procedures). 
 5 See Archuleta, 128 F.3d at 1452 (refusing to remand for further evidence on Archuleta’s family 
circumstances because the Guidelines limit departures based on family ties). 
 6 See Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 346 (2004) 
(stating that the impact on families is the most significant collateral effect of incarceration); John 
Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and 
Prisoners, 26 CRIME & JUST. 121, 123, 139–40 (1999) (describing the myriad negative effects of 
incarceration on an inmate’s family members). 
 7 See COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION, NAT’L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES 6 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSE-
QUENCES], http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18613/the-growth-of-incarceration-in-the-united-states-expl
oring-causes [http://perma.cc/DF62-NDT4] (recognizing the correlation between incarceration and 
negative social and economic outcomes for inmates’ families); Brown, supra note 6, at 347 (stating 
that parental incarceration can lead to poor school performance and depression in children, as well as 
financial challenges for caregivers). 
 8 See generally COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES, supra note 7 (describing the effects of 
incarceration on both inmates and their families); Emily Badger, The Meteoric, Costly and Unprece-
dented Rise of Incarceration in America, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/04/30/the-meteoric-costly-and-unprecedented-rise-of-incarceration-in-
america/ [http://perma.cc/98TT-LCBK] (discussing the results of the National Research Council re-
port); Eduardo Porter, In the U.S., Punishment Comes Before the Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://nyti.ms/1hPCkIu [http://perma.cc/D3QA-7NT3] (discussing incarceration in the U.S. generally 
and the 2014 National Research Council report); When a Parent Goes to Prison, a Child Also Pays a 
Price, NPR (June 8, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/06/08/320071553/when-a-parent-goes-to-prison-
a-child-also-pays-a-price [http://perma.cc/9GWB-LR4E] (discussing the National Research Council 
report and the effects of parental incarceration on children). Researchers have only recently gained 
access to national, longitudinal data about these impacts. See COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES, 
supra note 7, at 275 (recognizing the limitation of small sample sizes in past studies, as well as the 
fact that more recent studies are based on just three data sets of recently available longitudinal data). 
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steps to initiate reform, adding a new chapter to the long history of federal sen-
tencing reforms.9 
Over the past ten years, revisions to the Federal Guidelines and several 
seminal U.S. Supreme Court decisions have resulted in significant changes to 
federal sentencing.10 Despite those changes, federal sentencing procedures 
continue to ignore the interplay between a defendant’s family responsibilities 
and the impact of sentencing on a defendant’s family.11 Probation officers and 
district courts still lack a comprehensive way to communicate and analyze 
family impact during sentencing.12 Today, defendants’ families face the same 
broken system that the Archuleta family faced in 1997.13 The impact on de-
fendants’ families is often described as “collateral damage” in the sentencing 
process.14 This description underscores the limited role family impact plays 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, S. 1410, 113th Cong. (proposing several sentencing re-
forms, including the reduction of sentences for certain drug offenses); COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSE-
QUENCES, supra note 7, at 44 (describing the series of sentencing reforms that took place from the 
1970s to the present); Roy L. Austin, Jr. & Karol Mason, Empowering Our Young People, and Stem-
ming the Collateral Damage of Incarceration, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Oct. 8, 2014, 7:30 PM), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/10/08/empowering-our-young-people-and-stemming-collateral-dam
age-incarceration [http://perma.cc/39C6-H7GW] (discussing an October 8, 2014 White House event 
announcing programs to support children of incarcerated parents); Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Are More 
Criminal Justice Reforms on the Horizon in 2015?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/laurenbrooke-eisen/are-more-criminal-justice_b_6392102.html [http:// perma.cc/
9LRC-5BHU] (discussing changes to the criminal justice system in 2014 and proposed changes for 
2015). 
 10 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (holding that courts may grant a departure 
from the Guidelines absent extraordinary circumstances); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 
(2007) (reaffirming United States v. Booker by holding that the Guidelines provide a first step in fed-
eral sentencing and that courts can tailor sentences outside of the Guidelines ranges); United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the Federal Guidelines are not mandatory); Ryan W. 
Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010) 
(describing a series of changes to federal sentencing initiated in 2005); Michael A. Simons, Prosecu-
torial Discretion in the Shadow of Advisory Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums, 19 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 377, 382–84 (2010) (describing how differently a defendant might have been sen-
tenced before and after United States v. Booker). 
 11 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (stat-
ing that “family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant” to sentencing decisions); Edward 
Juel, Renewed Opportunities for Sentencing Advocacy, 58 FED. LAW. 30, 30 (2011) (observing revi-
sions to the Guidelines in 2010 that allow courts to consider other defendant characteristics like age 
and mental health). This policy of disregarding family ties has been firm since the Guidelines were first 
drafted in 1987. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
1987) (stating that family ties are “not ordinarily relevant” to sentencing decisions). 
 12 See OFFICE OF PROB. & PRETRIAL SERV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE PRESEN-
TENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT, at II-4 (2006) [hereinafter P.S.I. REPORT] (constraining analysis of 
family circumstances to limited applications, such as a defendant’s ability to pay restitution). 
 13 See Archuleta, 128 F.3d at 1452. 
 14 See Tanya Krupat, Invisibility and Children’s Rights: The Consequences of Parental Incarcera-
tion, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 39, 43 (2007) (arguing that children of inmates should not be treated as 
“collateral damage”); Katy Reckdahl, Mass Incarceration’s Collateral Damage: The Children Left Be-
hind, NATION (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/193121/mass-incarcerations-collateral-
1504 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1501 
during sentencing.15 In the same way federal sentencing procedures treat vic-
tims as third-party stakeholders, these procedures must also recognize defend-
ants’ families as stakeholders.16 
This Note argues that law and policy require courts to evaluate the impact 
of sentencing on a defendant’s family.17 In order to accomplish this, two 
changes must be realized.18 First, the U.S. Sentencing Commission must revise 
the Federal Guidelines to require judges to consider family impact as a factor 
in sentencing decisions.19 Second, the Judicial Conference should amend Rule 
32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require that presentence in-
vestigation reports include a family impact assessment.20 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of federal sentencing procedures 
regarding a defendant’s family responsibilities and includes an introduction to 
impact assessments.21 Part II looks at the long-term impact of those decisions 
on families of inmates, reviews how courts apply federal sentencing proce-
dures regarding family responsibilities, and provides an example of how San 
Francisco has successfully incorporated family impact assessments into its sen-
tencing procedures.22 Part III argues that the Guidelines should be amended to 
require consideration of family ties, and that assessments of the impact of sen-
tences on defendants’ families should be provided to sentencing courts in all 
federal criminal cases.23 
                                                                                                                           
damage-children-left-behind [http://perma.cc/MHP6-23FX] (discussing the collateral costs incarceration 
imposes on families). 
 15 See Krupat, supra note 14, at 41 (describing the impact of incarceration on inmates’ families as 
invisible due to a lack of understanding and acknowledgement about the problem); Tamar Lerer, Sen-
tencing the Family: Recognizing the Needs of Dependent Children in the Administration of the Crimi-
nal Justice System, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 24, 30 (2013) (describing the children of defendants as 
invisible victims of incarceration). 
 16 See King & Norgard, supra note 5, at 1124 (arguing for the use of family impact evidence to 
balance victim impact evidence during sentencing of capital crimes); Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of 
Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family, and the Community, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169, 180–81 
(1996) (observing the harmful effects of incarceration on inmates’ families and arguing that family 
circumstances must not be disregarded). 
 17 See infra notes 175–218 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 175–218 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 187–199 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 200–218 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 24–93 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 94–174 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 175–218 and accompanying text. 
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I. FEDERAL SENTENCING PROCEDURES: THEN AND NOW 
For the past twenty-five years, courts have used Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) as part of sentencing procedures in criminal cases.24 
Yet for the past ten years, courts have no longer been required to follow those 
Guidelines in all cases.25 This change has allowed courts to craft individual-
ized sentences based on a defendant’s characteristics and the nature of the 
crime.26 This Part presents an overview of current federal sentencing proce-
dures as they relate to family responsibilities.27 Section A provides a brief his-
tory of the Guidelines.28 Section B introduces current federal sentencing pro-
cedures.29 Section C discusses impact assessments for both victims and de-
fendants’ families and the role these assessments play in sentencing deci-
sions.30 
A. Federal Sentencing Procedures Under the Mandatory Guidelines 
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) in re-
sponse to widespread criticism of federal sentencing practices.31 Beginning in 
the early 20th century, all three branches shared sentencing responsibilities: 
Congress set maximum sentences, judges set the sentence for an individual, 
and parole boards, under the auspices of the executive branch, determined 
when an individual had been rehabilitated and could be released from their 
sentence.32 Although the Department of Probation provided a brief report with 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) 
(stating that the Guidelines first went into effect in 1987); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
391 (1989) (holding that the Guidelines are binding authority during criminal sentencing). 
 25 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the Guidelines are no 
longer mandatory and are only advisory); United States v. Ameline, 400 F.3d 646, 655 (9th Cir.), 
reh’g en banc, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (remanding a case for reconsideration of a sentence 
under the newly advisory Guidelines); United States v. Schlifer, 403 F.3d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(remanding for resentencing because the district court applied the Guidelines as if they were still 
mandatory). 
 26 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46 (holding that courts can “tailor” sentences to individuals by 
taking a defendant’s characteristics into consideration); Ameline, 400 F.3d at 655–56 (recognizing that 
under the advisory Guidelines courts must consider a defendant’s characteristics in order to create 
individualized sentences). 
 27 See infra notes 31–93 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 31–49 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 50–70 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 71–93 and accompanying text. 
 31 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365 (tracing the history of the SRA’s reforms back to concerns re-
garding indeterminate sentencing and judges’ “unfettered discretion”); Marc Miller, Purposes at Sen-
tencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 434–35 (1992) (arguing that the SRA was grounded in a rejection of 
both indeterminate sentencing and the dominant principle that punishment could be a means of reha-
bilitating offenders). 
 32 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365 (describing the division of sentencing roles among the three 
branches). 
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a recommended sentence, judges were able to apply or ignore that recommen-
dation at their discretion.33 The SRA eliminated parole boards and emphasized 
uniformity in sentencing.34 
One of the cornerstones of the SRA was the establishment of a Sentenc-
ing Commission tasked with creating sentencing guidelines.35 By April 1987, 
the Commission had drafted its first set of Guidelines, which went into effect 
six months later.36 The Guidelines were mandatory and created a rigid struc-
ture designed to limit judicial discretion through the application of uniform 
sentences.37 Congress designed the Guidelines to ignore mitigating factors, 
such as a defendant’s family responsibilities, because it feared that recognizing 
such factors might result in exacerbating existing sentencing disparities.38 
Judges could order a “departure” from a Guideline sentence, accompanied by a 
written statement explaining their reasons for departure, but only in rare in-
                                                                                                                           
 33 See Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher Peikin, Evolving Roles in Federal Sentencing: The Post-
Booker/Fanfan World, 1 FED. CTS. L. REV. 301, 303 (2006) (reviewing the structure of sentencing 
pre-1984). 
 34 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987) 
(observing that uniformity was one of three goals of the SRA); Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress 
in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the 
Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 189 (1993) 
(stating that in order to ensure compliance and effect the desired goal of uniformity, Congress made 
the Guidelines mandatory and put an end to parole). 
 35 See Hatch, supra note 34, at 188–89 (asserting that the creation of a Sentencing Commission 
was revolutionary); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 384–85 (describing the Sentencing Commission as 
an unusual government organization due to its responsibilities and independence). 
 36 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987) (dis-
cussing the timeline for the creation and implementation of the Guidelines); Stephen Breyer, The 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1, 5 (1988) (providing details regarding the creation of the Guidelines). 
 37 See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2004: AN 
EXPERIMENT THAT HAS FAILED 12 (Sept. 2004), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/
SentencingGuidelines_3.pdf [http://perma.cc/FN82-FSEB] (maintaining that application of the Guide-
lines reduced judicial discretion at sentencing); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: 
The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 884 (1990) (noting that 
the Guidelines were mandatory); Brenda L. Tofte, Booker at Seven: Looking Behind Sentencing Deci-
sions: What Is Motivating Judges?, 65 ARK. L. REV. 529, 543 (2012) (describing sentencing under the 
Guidelines as formulaic). 
 38 See Dana L. Shoenberg, Departures for Family Ties and Responsibilities After Koon, 9 FED. 
SENT’G. REP. 292, 295 (1997) (stating that the Guidelines ignored family ties because of concern that 
recognizing them would privilege men who were financial providers for traditional, two-parent fami-
lies). Some have pointed to legislative history to argue that the Sentencing Commission’s limitation 
on family ties as a sentencing factor is contrary to congressional intent. See Thomas W. Hillier II, Fed. 
Pub. Def., W. Dist. of Wash., & Davina Chen, Assistant Fed. Pub. Def., Cent. Dist. of Cal., Joint 
Statement at the U.S. Sentencing Commission Public Hearing: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: 
25 Years Later, at 35 (May 27, 2009), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-
process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20090527-28/ChenHillier_Testimony.pdf [http://perma.cc/
742P-AR2J] (reviewing the SRA’s legislative history regarding family ties). 
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stances.39 As Congress drafted the Guidelines, it took additional steps to re-
form federal sentencing.40 Congress established mandatory minimum sentenc-
es several years before the Guidelines took effect, further reducing judicial 
discretion.41 
After only a few years, it became clear that the Guidelines were not 
achieving uniformity in sentencing, one of the major goals of the SRA.42 This 
was due in part to the Guidelines’ complexity, which led courts to inconsistent-
                                                                                                                           
 39 See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 37, at 9–10 (observing that departures were 
acceptable only in unusual situations). Departures, as with all sentencing decisions under the Guide-
lines, were subject to appellate review by either party, both the government and the defendant. See 
Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 270 (1993) (discussing appellate review of 
sentences that departed from the Guidelines). The U.S. Sentencing Commission defines a departure as 
a deviation from a Guideline sentence based on a provision of the Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, DEPARTURE AND VARIANCE PRIMER 1 (2013), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
training/primers/Primer_Departure_and_Variance.pdf [http://perma.cc/7P88-ZNFE] [hereinafter DE-
PARTURE PRIMER]. In contrast, a variance is a deviation from a Guideline sentence that is based on a 
statutory factor that is external to the Guidelines. See id. For the purposes of this Note the term “de-
parture” will be used to refer to both departures and variances. 
 40 See Hatch, supra note 34, at 192 (stating that, between 1984 and 1990, Congress passed a se-
ries of mandatory minimum sentences for drug-related and violent crimes). 
 41 See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 37, at 12 (maintaining that mandatory mini-
mums were a further limit on judicial discretion); William K. Sessions III, Federal Sentencing Policy: 
Changes Since the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Evolving Role of the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission, The Thomas E. Fairchild Lecture (Apr. 15, 2011) in 2012 WIS. L. REV. 85, 92–93 
(arguing that the enactment of mandatory minimum sentences removed sentencing policy-making 
from the sphere of the Sentencing Commission). Congress sought to deter drug-related and violent 
crimes in particular, imposing extensive jail time. See Hatch, supra note 34, at 192 (discussing Con-
gress’ goals in setting mandatory minimum sentences). Some argued that the Guidelines, in tandem 
with mandatory minimums, resulted in unfair prison sentences. See id. at 194 (recognizing that man-
datory minimums prevent even the small degree of individualized punishment provided for under the 
Guidelines); Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech Delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy at the American 
Bar Association Annual Meeting, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 126, 127 (stating that mandatory minimums 
were neither wise nor necessary when used with the Guidelines). 
 42 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987) 
(noting that uniformity was one of the goals of the SRA); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 
37, at 18–19 (discussing the reasons for the Guidelines’ failure to achieve uniform sentences); Hatch, 
supra note 34, at 190 (noting that, within a few years of implementation, many criticized the Guide-
lines for failing to achieve sentencing uniformity). 
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ly apply the Guidelines.43 Many voiced their criticism as the effects of the 
Guidelines came into focus over the next decade.44 
The U.S. Supreme Court paid heed to mounting criticism in a decision 
that rendered the Guidelines far less restrictive of judicial discretion.45 In 2005, 
in United States v. Booker, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the mandatory 
Guidelines were unconstitutional and remedied that problem by making them 
advisory rather than mandatory.46 The Court determined that the Guidelines 
should be used to guide rather than control sentencing.47 The Court further 
elaborated that judges must be able to “tailor” individualized sentences based 
on statutory concerns such as the history and characteristics of each defend-
ant.48 In several successive opinions, the Supreme Court clarified that the 
Guidelines should be the first step in district court sentencing procedures, even 
though the Guidelines were no longer a binding end point.49 
B. Family Ties and Current Federal Sentencing Procedures 
Current federal sentencing procedures are based on a slow evolution that 
took nearly ten years to develop after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 37, at 19 (citing the fact that within two weeks 
three appellate courts reached three different sentences for the same crime). Critics also blamed a lack 
of uniformity in sentencing on prosecutors for granting downward departures to defendants who pro-
vided the government with “substantial assistance” against co-conspirators. See id. at 17. Mandatory 
minimums also resulted in inconsistent application of Guideline sentences. See Hatch, supra note 34 
at 194 (reflecting on the inconsistent application of mandatory minimums and its effect on the uni-
formity of the Guidelines). Others note that inconsistencies between sentencing statutes and the 
Guidelines led to inconsistent results. See Stith & Koh, supra note 39, at 272. 
 44 See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 72 (1996) (describing the Guidelines as the 
most widely criticized federal sentencing reform); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: 
Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1236 (2004) (remarking on the significant hostili-
ty directed at the Guidelines); Miller, supra note 31, at 478 (noting that judges, scholars, and attorneys 
were critical of the Guidelines); Stith & Koh, supra note 39, at 281 (observing that many criticized the 
Guidelines). 
 45 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46 (reviewing recent decisions and rendering the Guidelines advi-
sory rather than mandatory). 
 46 See id. (finding 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which made the Guidelines mandatory, unconstitution-
al). The first part of the Booker opinion, written by Justice Stevens, deemed the Guidelines unconsti-
tutional because they enabled a judge to decide matters of fact at sentencing, thereby violating a de-
fendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have facts decided by a jury. See id. at 244. In addition to making 
the Guidelines advisory, Booker limited the Guidelines further by returning to a reasonableness stand-
ard for appellate review of sentences. See id. at 261 (discarding the de novo review standard as im-
plemented by legislation enacted in 2003 and returning to a reasonableness standard). 
 47 See id. at 245. This was decided in the second part of the majority’s opinion, which was written 
by Justice Breyer. See id. 
 48 See id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 
 49 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (describing the Guidelines as the starting 
point in sentencing); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (stating that the Guidelines are 
the first consideration in sentencing, but each party can still argue for departures). 
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Booker.50 Widespread change in sentencing procedures did not take shape until 
2010, when the Sentencing Commission released revised Guidelines.51 The 
revised Guidelines reiterated a new three-step sentencing process that the Su-
preme Court established in its post-Booker decisions: (1) begin with the Guide-
lines; (2) allow both parties to argue for and against following the Guideline 
sentence or allowing an upward or downward departure from that sentence; (3) 
then consider any other relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).52 Rule 32 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also reflects this new three-step 
process, which was incorporated in particular in the presentence investigation 
and report.53 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1633 (2012) 
(describing post-Booker changes to federal sentencing procedures as gradual). After its decision in 
Booker, the U.S. Supreme Court issued further opinions elaborating changes to the Guidelines. See 
Gall, 552 U.S. at 47 (rejecting an appellate court’s requirement of extraordinary circumstances to 
justify a district court’s departure from the Guidelines); Rita, 551 U.S. at 350 (noting that courts can 
depart or vary from the Guidelines given individual circumstances). Rita also held that, in accordance 
with Booker, there is no legal presumption that a Guideline sentence must apply. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 
351. 
 51 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2010) 
(discussing revisions to the Guidelines due to Booker); Juel, supra note 11, at 30 (noting that the 2010 
revisions to the Guidelines implemented the changes established in Booker). Within two weeks of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, Attorney General James Comey issued a memorandum to 
federal prosecutors advising them to fight for sentences within the applicable Guidelines range. See 
Amy Baron-Evans, The Continuing Struggle for Just, Effective and Constitutional Sentencing After 
United States v. Booker: Why and How the Guidelines Do Not Comply with § 3553(a), 30 CHAMPION 
32, 32 (2006) (describing the memo as flouting the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker); Memoran-
dum from James B. Comey, Dep. Atty. Gen., to all federal prosecutors (Jan. 28, 2005), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/dag_jan_28_comey_memo_on_
booker.pdf [http://perma.cc/HZV8-PSPD] [hereinafter Comey Memo]. Comey’s memo directed pros-
ecutors to report any sentence that was not within the Guidelines range on a form that was included 
with the memo. See Comey Memo, supra, at “Booker Sentencing Report Form.” Under pressure from 
the Department of Justice, courts were slow to adapt to a world in which the Guidelines were no long-
er mandatory. See Baron-Evans, supra, at 32 (observing that within two years of Booker seven Circuit 
Courts had openly ignored Booker’s holding, while district courts were also pursuing Guideline sen-
tences without reference to Booker). The Sentencing Commission issued revised Guidelines in 2010. 
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2010) 
(explaining how Booker initiated changes to the Guidelines and detailing the new application instruc-
tions). 
 52 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50 (describing these steps as a sequential 
procedure); Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 (beginning to formulate these steps); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2010) (outlining these steps); Sessions, supra note 
41, at 97 (describing the new procedures as a three-step process). Consideration of factors under 
§ 3553(a), such as a defendant’s history and characteristics, may or may not lead to a departure. See 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). Instead, consid-
eration of § 3553(a) factors may simply lead to a sentence on the lower or higher end of the Guide-
lines range. See id. 
 53 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory committee’s note (2007) (noting changes to the rule that 
reflect the holding in Booker). 
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Section 3553(a) requires courts to consider several factors relevant to set-
ting an appropriate sentence.54 Among those factors, § 3553(a)(1) includes the 
broad factor of “the history and characteristics” of a defendant.55 That category 
had been virtually neglected by the mandatory Guidelines.56 Courts and the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission have interpreted the term “characteristics” to 
apply to a range of defendant characteristics, including family ties and respon-
sibilities.57 The 2010 revisions to the Guidelines indicated that the characteris-
tics of age, mental health, emotional and physical conditions, and military ser-
vice may now be possible grounds for a departure.58 The 1987, 2010, and 2014 
Guidelines, however, contain a policy statement, section 5H1.6, stating that the 
characteristic of family ties and responsibilities is “not ordinarily relevant” and 
should not be a factor in sentencing decisions.59 
The Sentencing Commission interpreted congressional instructions re-
garding consideration of defendant characteristics in a way that directly con-
                                                                                                                           
 54 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (listing factors courts must consider at sentencing). 
 55 See id. at § 3553(a)(1) (including the “history and characteristics of the defendant” as a factor 
relevant to determining a sentence). 
 56 See Anello & Peikin, supra note 33, at 326 (stating that defendant characteristics were not 
taken into account under the Guidelines); Sessions, supra note 41, at 97 (noting that the factors in 
§ 3553(a) enable a judge to consider the defendant as an individual and that considering these factors 
was discouraged under the Guidelines). 
 57 See United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that Booker 
opened the door to allow courts to consider family responsibilities as part of a defendant’s characteris-
tics); DEPARTURE PRIMER, supra note 39, at 38–40 (including family circumstances in a list of 
§ 3553(a) factors); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2014) (including family ties and responsibilities in the chapter on “Specific Offender Char-
acteristics”). 
 58 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. C (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2010) 
(inserting language indicating that these factors may be relevant at sentencing). In May 2010 Attorney 
General Eric Holder issued a memorandum acknowledging the 2010 Guidelines revisions by noting 
that the Guidelines were advisory only and encouraging prosecutors to make an assessment of an 
appropriate sentence based on the unique facts of each case. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, 
Jr., Atty. Gen., to all federal prosecutors (May 19, 2010), http://www.nylj.com/nylawyer/adgifs/
decisions/060110holdermemo.pdf [http://perma.cc/TT9H-SKUX]. 
 59 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014); U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2010); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987). The Guidelines’ section 5H1.6, 
which indicates that family ties are not ordinarily relevant to sentencing decisions, is a policy state-
ment from the Sentencing Commission, rather than an actual guideline. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). Booker effectively overruled a group of 
decisions from the early 1990s in which the U.S. Supreme Court gave policy statements great weight. 
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46 (rendering the Guidelines advisory only and allowing courts to “tai-
lor” sentences according to factors outside of the Guidelines); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 
42 (1993) (stating that the Guidelines’ policy statements are binding authority in federal courts); Wil-
liams v. United States, 503 U. S. 193, 201 (1992) (describing policy statements as “an authoritative 
guide” to the Guidelines); Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 50, at 1653–55 (reviewing the Supreme 
Court’s decisions regarding the binding nature of policy statements). 
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flicted with congressional instructions to sentencing judges.60 Section 3553(a) 
directs sentencing courts to consider a broad range of factors, including a de-
fendant’s characteristics, when determining a sentence.61 In contrast, § 994(e) 
of title 28 directs the Sentencing Commission to draft guidelines that will not 
focus on whether a defendant has family ties when recommending a sentence 
of imprisonment.62 In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 3661 states that courts have no 
limit on their ability to consider information regarding a defendant’s back-
ground and character during sentencing.63 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Booker and the Court’s directive to consider defendant characteristics under 
§ 3553(a) helped to mitigate this conflict to some extent.64 In Booker, the U.S. 
Supreme Court acknowledged that consideration of a defendant’s characteris-
tics under § 3553(a) is an important step in tailoring sentences to individual 
defendants.65 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Six Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 11 (2011) (statement of Judge Patti B. Saris, Chair, 
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n) (noting that §§ 994 and 3553(a) provide conflicting instructions to sentenc-
ing courts and the Sentencing Commission); Douglas A. Berman, Addressing Why: Developing Prin-
cipled Rationales for Family-Based Departures, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 274, 274 (2001) (discussing the 
lack of clarity in regard to congressional mandates concerning the consideration of offender character-
istics at sentencing); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable 
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1715 (1992) (stating that chapter 5, part 
H of the Guidelines, dealing with offender characteristics, conflicts with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 
3661). 
 61 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (“The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, 
shall consider—(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of 
the defendant . . . .”). 
 62 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2012). Many have pointed to the SRA’s legislative history to indicate 
that Congress enacted § 994(e) to protect defendants from being incarcerated simply because of their 
lack of employment, education, or family or community ties. See Hillier & Chen, supra note 38, at 35 
(citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 175 (1983)). Supporting this view is the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
further statement that these factors may be useful in deciding on a sentence of probation instead of 
imprisonment. See id. at 35–36. The concern was that the Guidelines might be used to remove disad-
vantaged defendants from their community and move them into prisons. See id. at 36. 
 63 See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); Freed, supra 
note 60, at 1695 (noting that the Guidelines conflict with statutory requirements); Christina Chiafolo 
Montgomery, Social and Schematic Injustice: The Treatment of Offender Personal Characteristics 
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 27, 35 
(1993) (discussing conflict between §§ 3661, 3553(a), and 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)); Donald C. Wayne, 
Comment, Chaotic Sentencing: Downward Departures Based on Extraordinary Family Circumstanc-
es, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 443, 453 n.19 (1993) (observing the conflict between 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) and 18 
U.S.C. § 3661). 
 64 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46 (holding that courts can individualize sentences by following 
statutes like § 3553(a) rather than simply adhering to the Guidelines). 
 65 See Lynn Adelman, U.S. Dist. Judge, E. Dist. of Wis., Remarks at the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission Public Hearing: A View from the Judiciary 1 (Feb. 15, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/2005
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As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, Rule 32 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also references defendant characteris-
tics.66 Federal statute mandates that a probation officer conduct a presentence 
investigation and prepare a report for the sentencing court.67 Rules 32(c) and 
(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure describe the method of investi-
gation and required contents of that report.68 The report gathers information 
about the defendant, including his or her criminal history, details of the crime, 
and information about the defendant’s history and characteristics as per 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).69 Using the Guidelines and facts from the case, the proba-
tion officer also includes a recommended sentence in the presentence investi-
gation report.70 
C. Impact Assessments: Third-Party Rights at Sentencing 
As a statutory requirement, federal presentence investigation reports in-
clude victim impact assessments.71 In general, victim impact assessments alert 
the court to the financial, economic, emotional, and psychological harm expe-
rienced by a third party, a victim, as a result of a defendant’s crime.72 Victim 
impact assessments have become the model for two other third-party assess-
ments: execution and family impact assessments.73 
                                                                                                                           
0215-16/Adelman_testimony.pdf [http://perma.cc/VAW9-R3N6]) (stating that the Booker decision 
reflects the need to make individualized sentences); Simons, supra note 10, at 384 (arguing that Book-
er created a balance between uniformity and individualized sentences). 
 66 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory committee’s note (2007) (noting that post-Booker, factors 
under § 3553(a) can be considered and have therefore been added to 32(d)(2)). 
 67 See 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (2012) (requiring that a presentence investigation and report be provided 
to the court pursuant to Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). 
 68 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)–(d) (detailing the presentence investigation and contents of the 
presentence investigation report). The probation officer preparing the presentence investigation report 
also follows guidelines set out in a manual produced by the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts. See P.S.I. REPORT, supra note 12, at i-1. This publication was last updated in March 2006 to 
reflect changes initiated by Booker. See id. 
 69 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(G) (indicating that the presentence investigation report must 
include information relevant to § 3553(a)). 
 70 See id. R. 32(d)(1) (describing the steps involved in calculating a Guideline sentence and as-
sessing any potential mitigating or aggravating factors that might warrant an upward or downward 
departure). 
 71 See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-291, § 3, 96 Stat. 1248, 1249 (mak-
ing a victim impact assessment a required element of presentence investigation reports); FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(B) (indicating that the presentence investigation report must include an assessment 
of victim impact). For the purposes of this Note the term “impact assessment” refers only to infor-
mation that would ordinarily be written by a probation officer as part of a presentence investigation 
report. As it is used here, the term does not encompass statements that may be read by a victim or 
victims’ family during sentencing. 
 72 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(B) (listing the required contents of a victim impact assessment).  
 73 See Kevin T. Wolff & Monica K. Miller, Victim and Execution Impact Statements: What Judg-
es Should Know About Case Law and Psychological Research, 92 JUDICATURE 148, 149 (2009) (link-
ing victim and execution impact statements); New York Initiative for Children of Incarcerated Parents 
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Victim impact assessments were first used in federal criminal sentencing 
during the early 1980s.74 In response to growing concerns regarding increased 
crime rates in the 1970s, President Reagan initiated research into possible vic-
tims’ rights legislation in April 1982.75 The resulting report recommended that 
victims, who had historically been absent as stakeholders in the criminal jus-
tice system, be represented in various ways during criminal proceedings.76 In 
September 1982, Congress made victim impact evidence at sentencing a statu-
tory right for victims.77 Accordingly, probation officers prepare a victim im-
pact assessment to determine a crime’s medical, psychological, social, and fi-
nancial impact on a victim.78 
Critics of victim impact evidence have called for a counterbalance to that 
powerful evidence in one particular context: execution impact evidence in cap-
ital cases.79 This evidence describes the impact an execution will have on a 
                                                                                                                           
Family Responsibility Statement: Considering the Needs of Children, OSBORNE ASS’N (May 2014), 
http://www.osborneny.org/images/uploads/printMedia/FRS_Factsheet_Osborne%20Association_2
014.pdf [http://perma.cc/R9EY-JUHJ] [hereinafter New York Initiative for Children of Incarcerated 
Parents] (noting that family impact assessments are similar in function to victim impact assessments). 
 74 See Victim and Witness Protection Act § 103 (adding victim impact assessments to presentence 
investigation report procedures). 
 75 See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT, at ii (1982), http://
www.ovc.gov/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/welcome.html [http://perma.cc/BVN9-H8YE] (dis-
cussing the establishment of the task force). Grassroots organizations like Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving were also driving forces in the victims’ rights movement. See Danielle Levine, Public Wrongs 
and Private Rights: Limiting the Victim’s Role in a System of Public Prosecution, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
335, 341 (2010). 
 76 See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 75, at 33 (including a rec-
ommendation that presentence investigation reports include victim impact assessments); Levine, su-
pra note 75, at 335 (stating that victims are ignored in the criminal justice system). Some argue that 
victims are already represented in the criminal justice system through public prosecutors that represent 
the government and the interests of society at large. See Abraham Abramovsky, Victim Impact State-
ments: Adversely Impacting upon Judicial Fairness, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 21, 31–32 
(1992) (discussing arguments that prosecutors are victims’ representatives at trial). 
 77 See Victim and Witness Protection Act § 103 (amending Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure to incorporate victim impact evidence into presentence investigation reports); Wolff & 
Miller, supra note 73, at 150 (recognizing that the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 gave 
victims new opportunities to participate in sentencing). In 1991, in Payne v. Tennessee, the U.S. Su-
preme Court opened the door to victim impact evidence at sentencing just four years after holding 
such testimony unconstitutional. See 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (holding that the Eighth Amendment is 
not a per se bar against the use of victim impact evidence at sentencing). 
 78 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(B). 
 79 See King & Norgard, supra note 5, at 1124 (calling for a balance to victim impact sentences in 
capital cases through the use of execution impact evidence); Wayne A. Logan, When Balance and 
Fairness Collide: An Argument for Execution Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 33 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 1, 4–5 (1999–2000) (noting that execution impact evidence is one way to repair the imbal-
ance caused by victim impact evidence). Critics maintain that victim participation at sentencing un-
fairly elevates the rights of victims above the established rights of defendants. See Mary Fan, Adver-
sarial Justice’s Casualties: Defending Victim-Witness Protection, 55 B.C. L. REV. 775, 784 (2014) 
(maintaining that legal scholars are frequent critics of the victims’ rights movement); Julian V. Rob-
erts, Listening to the Crime Victim: Evaluating Victim Input at Sentencing and Parole, 38 CRIME & 
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defendant’s family members, much as victim impact evidence in capital cases 
gives voice to the grief and loss of a victim’s family.80 Supporters of execution 
impact evidence argue that this evidence provides important insight into a de-
fendant’s character.81 Now that a defendant’s characteristics must be consid-
ered during step three of the federal sentencing process, arguments in favor of 
execution impact evidence have gained footing.82 
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the admissibility of execution 
impact evidence.83 In 1978, in Lockett v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court ap-
peared to pave the way to admissibility.84 The Court’s decision in Lockett re-
quired sentencing judges to consider mitigating evidence in capital cases.85 In 
                                                                                                                           
JUST. 347, 349 (2009) (noting that victims’ rights in the criminal justice process may be a threat to the 
rights of defendants). But see Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 611, 611 (2009) (arguing that victim impact statements do not interfere with defendants’ 
interests). One particular concern is that victim impact evidence will increase sentences unfairly by 
evoking sympathy for the victim rather than meting out a just punishment based on the offense alone. 
See Robert C. Black, Forgotten Penological Purposes: A Critique of Victim Participation in Sentenc-
ing, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 225, 232 (1994) (observing that victim participation at sentencing may lead to a 
more severe sentence); Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology 
of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 452 (2003) (asserting that the emotional nature of victim 
impact evidence can improperly influence judges and juries). 
 80 See King & Norgard, supra note 5, at 1124 (describing execution impact evidence); Logan, 
supra note 79, at 5 (defining execution impact evidence). Scholars emphasize that a defendant’s fami-
ly is also victimized by the prospect of losing a loved one to a capital sentence. See King & Norgard, 
supra note 5, at 1124. 
 81 See King & Norgard, supra note 5, at 1125 (noting the relevance of this evidence as a reflec-
tion of the defendant’s character); Logan, supra note 79, at 38 (asserting that execution impact evi-
dence demonstrates a defendant’s character and is therefore relevant); Jalem Peguero, On Mitigation: 
The Role of “Execution Impact” Evidence, 16 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 65, 73 (2014) (ar-
guing that this type of evidence is relevant to elucidating the defendant’s character).  
 82 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2010) 
(describing the third step as an evaluation of factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which includes de-
fendant characteristics); Logan, supra note 79, at 13–14 (discussing the important role of character 
evidence in capital trials, in particular evidence regarding the potential impact of execution on family 
members). 
 83 See King & Norgard, supra note 5, at 1146 (arguing that allowing execution impact evidence 
would align with U.S. Supreme Court precedent requiring courts to consider all mitigating evidence); 
Logan, supra note 79, at 32–33 (stating that state courts have different approaches to the admissibility 
of execution impact evidence due to ambiguity regarding the U.S. Supreme Court’s view on this type 
of evidence). 
 84 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) (stating that the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require courts to consider mitigating factors in capital cases). 
 85 See id. (stating that mitigating factors must be considered during capital sentencing). The Court 
emphasized the need for individualization in cases in which capital punishment is a possible sentence. 
Id. at 605. Despite the holding in Lockett, most state courts do not allow execution impact evidence. 
See Logan, supra note 79, at 32–33 (providing an overview of the posture of execution impact evi-
dence in state courts); Darcy F. Katzin, Note, The Relevance of “Execution Impact” Testimony as 
Evidence of Capital Defendants’ Character, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1193, 1206 (1998) (noting that the 
highest courts in five states have ruled execution impact evidence inadmissible). The Supreme Court 
of California and the Oregon Supreme Court allow execution impact evidence in capital cases. See 
Logan, supra note 79, at 33. A recent decision from the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii 
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Lockett, the Court recognized that crafting individualized sentences required 
consideration of a variety of factors, particularly those related to the “life and 
characteristics” of the defendant.86 The holding in Lockett was limited to capi-
tal cases, but it is similar to the U.S. Supreme Court’s directive in Booker that 
a defendant’s characteristics must be considered at sentencing in accordance 
with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).87 
A small number of jurisdictions have applied or have considered applying 
the rationale from Lockett regarding execution impact evidence to all criminal 
cases by using family impact evidence, or assessments, in non-capital cases.88 
A family impact assessment is typically presented to judges as part of a presen-
tence investigation report conducted by a probation officer.89 A family impact 
assessment might indicate that a defendant is the sole caregiver for a child, or 
describe the relationship between the defendant and his or her children and 
spouse.90 
When a presentence investigation report includes a family impact assess-
ment, this information serves the interests of the defendant’s family by inform-
ing the court about the potential impact of a proposed sentence.91 Using this 
information, the court can craft a sentence that holds the defendant accountable 
for his or her crime, but also reflects the defendant’s status as a parent or inte-
gral family member and possibly utilizes alternatives to incarceration or proba-
tion in appropriate cases.92 Although some of the information provided in a 
                                                                                                                           
allowed execution impact evidence and provided clearly defined parameters for that evidence. See 
United States v. Williams, 18 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1071–72 (D. Haw. May 7, 2014) (holding that de-
fendant’s family could provide evidence of their relationship with defendant and the impact his death 
would have on them). 
 86 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602–03 (recognizing the need to consider details about the defendant 
in order to perform the long-established practice of creating individualized sentences). 
 87 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46 (permitting the sentencing court to consider “other statutory 
concerns” under § 3553); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604–05 (indicating that because individual characteris-
tics are considered in non-capital cases they are all the more important in capital cases due to the ir-
revocability of the sentence). 
 88 See S.F. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, at 9 (discussing San Francisco’s use 
of family impact assessments); Margaret Dizerega, San Francisco’s Family-Focused Probation: A 
Conversation with Chief Adult Probation Officer Wendy Still, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 54, 54 (2011) 
(describing San Francisco’s use of family impact assessments at sentencing); New York Initiative for 
Children of Incarcerated Parents, supra note 73 (listing jurisdictions that evaluate family circum-
stances at sentencing). 
 89 See Dizerega, supra note 88, at 54 (stating that family impact assessments can be included in a 
presentence investigation report). 
 90 See id. (noting that family impact evidence typically includes family details such as number of 
dependents and whether defendant is a primary caregiver); New York Initiative for Children of Incar-
cerated Parents, supra note 73 (referencing the possible items that can be included in a family impact 
assessment). 
 91 See New York Initiative for Children of Incarcerated Parents, supra note 73 (discussing the 
relevance and uses of family impact assessments). 
 92 See S.F. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 88, at 9 (stating that family impact assessments are 
not used to minimize a defendant’s culpability); New York Initiative for Children of Incarcerated 
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family impact assessment is already included in a presentence investigation 
report, the family impact assessment brings together this scattered information, 
sometimes supplementing it with additional details, in order to foreground the 
burden a sentence will place on the defendant’s family.93 
II. FAMILY IMPACT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO ADDRESS IT 
Despite revisions to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) 
that allow judges to consider additional factors at sentencing, judges have been 
hesitant to issue below-Guidelines sentences.94 In 2014 federal district judges 
used their discretion to apply below-Guidelines sentences, or downward depar-
tures, at the request of defendants in 21.4% of cases.95 The number of down-
                                                                                                                           
Parents, supra note 73 (noting that family impact assessments are meant to protect children, not pre-
vent parents from being punished). Children’s rights advocates in particular are seeking to incorporate 
family impact evidence at sentencing. See New York Initiative for Children of Incarcerated Parents, 
supra note 73 (advocating for the use of family impact evidence); Introduction, S.F. CHILDREN OF 
INCARCERATED PARENTS, http://www.sfcipp.org/intro.html [http://perma.cc/JM3U-APVL] (discuss-
ing the challenges facing children of incarcerated parents and the need to take them into consideration 
at sentencing). In 2005, the non-profit organization San Francisco Children of Incarcerated Parents 
(“SFCIP”) worked with children whose parents were imprisoned in order to draft a Children of Incar-
cerated Parents Bill of Rights. See Who We Are, S.F. CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS, 
http://www.sfcipp.org/whoweare.html [http://perma.cc/KF8X-NBVA] (describing the development of 
the Children of Incarcerated Parents Bill of Rights). This Bill of Rights has been influential to the 
work of other non-profit organizations as well as to city and state legislatures. See Right 3. I Have the 
Right to Be Considered When Decisions Are Made About My Parent, S.F. CHILDREN OF INCARCER-
ATED PARENTS, http://www.sfcipp.org/right3.html [http://perma.cc/7QS4-UATR]; see also New York 
Initiative for Children of Incarcerated Parents, OSBORNE ASS’N, http://www.osborneny.org/
programs.cfm?programID=23 [http://perma.cc/KQ3P-CWZE] (indicating that the New York Initiative 
for Children of Incarcerated Parents was inspired by the SFCIP Bill of Rights). 
 93 See P.S.I. REPORT, supra note 12, at II-1, II-3, II-4 (stating that probation officers can use these 
questions to determine how defendants’ family histories may have influenced their actions and to 
determine their ability to pay restitution). 
 94 See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 50, at 1677 (observing that rates of departure have been 
low even after United States v. Booker made the Guidelines advisory); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pen-
dulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1496–97 (2008) 
(suggesting that after applying the Guidelines for twenty years judges may be hesitant to depart from 
what had become routine sentencing practice). 
 95 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at 
tbl.N [hereinafter USSC 2014 SOURCEBOOK]. Sentences of imprisonment remain high with 87% of all 
sentences for terms of imprisonment only. See id. at fig.D. A total of 46% of all sentences in 2014 
were within the Guidelines range. See id. at tbl.N. Departures are often requested by the prosecution 
for providing information about other suspects. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (stating that courts may depart when the government makes a 
motion for a downward departure based on the defendant’s “substantial assistance in the investigation 
or prosecution of another person”). Government-sponsored departures accounted for 30.3% of all 
departures in 2014. See USSC 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra, at tbl.N. 
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ward departures granted varies widely based on the district and the crime.96 
Family ties were cited as a reason for a downward departure in only 2.5% of 
all federal cases sentenced in 2014.97 
This Part discusses how sentencing decisions impact families and ex-
plores how courts address that impact during sentencing.98 Section A reviews 
the long-term impact of incarceration on defendants’ families.99 Section B sur-
veys federal case law applying family ties departures.100 Section C discusses 
the use of family impact assessments during criminal sentencing in San Fran-
cisco, as well as proposed legislation to incorporate family impact assessments 
into Connecticut’s sentencing procedures.101 
A. What Is Family Impact? Documenting the Impact of Incarceration on 
Families of Inmates 
The Guidelines’ emphasis on the use of incarceration as a punishment has 
resulted in significant negative impacts on inmates’ families.102 In 2004, 63% 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, at A-40 [hereinafter USSC 2013 AN-
NUAL REPORT]. For example, the highest rate of below-Guidelines sentences in 2014 was 39.7% in 
the Second Circuit; the lowest was 14.4% in the Tenth Circuit. See USSC 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra 
note 95, at tbls.N-2 & N-10 (listing departure statistics for the Second and Tenth Circuits). 
 97 See USSC 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 95, at tbls.25, 25A & 25B (listing the reasons given 
for court-granted downward departures in 2014). Note that the author calculated this figure, 2.5%, by 
reference to Tables 25, 25A, and 25B, which separate departures based on the authority the court cited 
for each departure decision (for example, Booker or 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). See id. (providing raw 
numbers for court-granted downward departures based on circumstances like family ties); USSC 2013 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 96, at A-40 (describing how departure statistics are classified according 
to the authority courts cite for those departures). Few districts make sentencing decisions public, mak-
ing analysis of how and why courts decide whether to apply a departure a challenge. See Scott, supra 
note 10, at 1 (identifying Massachusetts as the only federal district to make the documentation accom-
panying sentencing decisions public); Tofte, supra note 37, at 535 (same). Of the inmates in federal 
prison, approximately 63% are parents, although 36% are primary caregivers to their children. See 
LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PARENTS IN PRISON 
AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 14 app. tbl.3 (2010). For the purposes of this Note, departures based on 
family ties or responsibilities will be referred to as “family ties departures.” 
 98 See infra notes 94–174 and accompanying text. 
 99 See infra notes 102–121 and accompanying text. 
 100 See infra notes 122–153 and accompanying text. 
 101 See infra notes 154–174 and accompanying text. 
 102 See COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES, supra note 7, at 262 (observing that incarceration 
results in weaker family relationships and decreased well-being of children); Baron-Evans & Stith, su-
pra note 50, at 1662 (noting that the Guidelines focused on incarceration as the primary mode of pun-
ishment). Since the adoption of the Guidelines in 1987, the federal prison population has increased by 
550%. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 2 tbl.1 (listing 
the number of inmates in federal prison at yearend 2013: 215,866); PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL IN-
STITUTIONS, YEAREND 1925-86, at 13 (1988) (listing the number of inmates in federal prison at year-
end 1986: 33,135). The federal incarceration rate has grown faster than all of the state incarceration 
rates. See COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES, supra note 7, at 55. Most agree that crime rates have 
not increased, but rather the rate and length of sentences has increased. See id. at 3 (pointing to policy 
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of federal inmates were parents of minor children, and 52.2% lived with their 
children prior to incarceration.103 For those inmates that lived with their chil-
dren, 36.1% of male inmates and 82.8% of female inmates were the primary 
caregivers.104 Of those inmates who were not primary caregivers, 54.9% 
shared caregiving responsibilities with someone else.105 In addition, 67.2% of 
inmates reported being the primary source of financial support to their children 
prior to incarceration.106 The widespread effect of sentencing expands even 
further when a defendant is a primary caregiver for dependents such as elderly 
parents or infirm siblings.107 
For the children of incarcerated parents, the impact of parental incarcera-
tion has been described as a traumatic experience similar to parental divorce or 
death.108 This trauma can delay a child’s mental and emotional development, 
leading to mental health consequences like depression as well as behavioral 
problems.109 The effects are not limited to the child’s home life, but extend to 
decreased performance in school.110 Parental incarceration also has strong 
                                                                                                                           
choices rather than crime rates as the cause for rising rates of incarceration); Hagan & Dinovitzer, 
supra note 6, at 129–30 (stating that incarceration and crime rates have not been correlated and that 
crime rates have been declining since the mid-1990s). 
 103 See GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 97, at 16 app. tbls.7 & 8. 
 104 See id. 
 105 See id. 
 106 See id. at 17 app. tbl.9. 
 107 See DAN MARKEL ET AL., PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE 
OF FAMILY TIES 50–51 (2009) (arguing that a defendant’s family responsibilities should be extended 
beyond children to include anyone for whom the defendant serves as a primary caregiver, including 
elderly parents). This collateral damage also has a ripple effect through communities. See Hagan & 
Dinovitzer, supra note 6, at 134 (stating that imprisonment of working males causes instability in their 
home communities); Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 468 
(2013) (recognizing that lack of education, unemployment, and unstable family life are often markers 
of communities with a large number of incarcerated citizens). 
 108 See Lerer, supra note 15, at 31 (linking parental incarceration to other forms of traumatic 
loss). In situations where an incarcerated parent was abusive, removal from parental custody is not 
associated with negative impacts. See SARA WAKEFIELD & CHRISTOPHER WILDEMAN, CHILDREN OF 
THE PRISON BOOM: MASS INCARCERATION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INEQUALITY 95 (2014) 
(noting the correlation between positive parental relationships and negative impacts of parental incar-
ceration on children); Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 
793, 812 (2011) (acknowledging that separation from an abusive parent may benefit a child). 
 109 See WAKEFIELD & WILDEMAN, supra note 108, at 154 (discussing behavioral problems asso-
ciated with parental incarceration); Lerer, supra note 15, at 31 (listing harms such as depression, de-
velopmental delays, and antisocial behavior); Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, The Effects of 
Parental Imprisonment on Children, 37 CRIME & JUST. 133, 135 (2008) (listing harms such as drug 
abuse, mental health problems, and antisocial behavior). 
 110 See Murray & Farrington, supra note 109, at 135 (citing school failure as one of the risks of 
parental incarceration on children); Tracy Tyson, Downward Departures Under the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines: Are Parenthood and Pregnancy Appropriate Sentencing Considerations?, 2 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 577, 604 (1993) (indicating that poor school performance is one of sever-
al negative outcomes of parental incarceration). 
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links to economic hardship for the families of inmates.111 Finally, incarceration 
can lead to a loss of parental rights when there are no alternative caregivers 
and a child is placed in foster care.112 Although foster care is a state-run pro-
gram, federal law requires that children in foster care for more than fifteen 
months be put up for adoption.113 
For incarcerated parents, maintaining relationships with minor children is 
complicated by both distance and cost.114 A 1997 report noted that 84% of fed-
eral inmates had been assigned to prisons that were over 100 miles from their 
residences, and that 43.3% of federal inmates were in prisons that were 500 
miles or more from their residences.115 Traveling to a federal prison to visit an 
inmate is therefore expensive and time-consuming, all the more so given that 
few federal prisons are accessible by public transportation.116 In 2004, 44.7% 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES, supra note 7, at 279 (maintaining that families 
often become homeless and rely on public assistance when a father is incarcerated); Lerer, supra note 
15, at 32–33 (stating that because incarcerated parents cannot make financial contributions to their 
families, children may face outcomes such as homelessness and lack of access to food and health 
care). 
 112 See Philip M. Genty, Damage to Family Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of Paren-
tal Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1671, 1678–79 (2003) (discussing the potential for inmates 
to lose parental rights during incarceration); Caitlin Mitchell, Family Integrity and Incarcerated Par-
ents: Bridging the Divide, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 175, 176 (2012) (stating that inmates without 
family networks are at risk of losing parental rights). The loss of parental rights due to incarceration 
disproportionately affects women, as 11% of female inmates have minor children in foster care 
whereas only 2% of male inmates report the same. See Jody L. King, Avoiding Gender Bias in Down-
ward Departures for Family Responsibilities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 273, 284 (1996) (recognizing the disproportionate impact of loss of custody on female 
inmates); Lerer, supra note 15, at 29 (providing statistics on inmates’ loss of parental rights). 
 113 See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a), 111 Stat. 2115, 
2118 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (2012)); Genty, supra note 112, at 1676 (discussing 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”), which requires states to begin termination of 
parental rights proceedings when a child has been in foster care for fifteen out of twenty-two months); 
Mitchell, supra note 112, at 176 (indicating that ASFA can have a significant impact on inmates with 
minor children). There has been an increase in the termination of parental rights for incarcerated par-
ents since Congress implemented ASFA. See Mitchell, supra note 112, at 188. In addition, ASFA 
provides states financial incentives of $4000 to $8000 per child adopted. See id. at 187. 
 114 See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INCARCERATED PARENTS 
AND THEIR CHILDREN 5 (2000) (indicating the distance between prisons and inmate residences); 
COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES, supra note 7, at 264 (noting the high cost of visiting and re-
maining in contact with inmates). 
 115 See MUMOLA, supra note 114, at 5. 
 116 See Megan Comfort, Punishment Beyond the Legal Offender, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 271, 
284 (2007) (discussing the cost of maintaining contact with inmates); Giovanna Shay, Visiting Room: 
A Response to Prison Visitation Policies: A Fifty-State Survey, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 195 
(2013) (noting that few prisons are accessible by public transportation); Tyson, supra note 110, at 605 
(1993) (stating that prisons are generally inaccessible via public transportation). Federal Correction 
Institution (“FCI”) Danbury is the only federal prison for female inmates on the East Coast. See Shay, 
supra, at 195. The Bureau of Prisons planned to close the female portion of FCI Danbury in 2013 but 
reversed course amid widespread criticism. See id.; Piper Kerman, For Women, a Second Sentence, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/14/opinion/for-women-a-second-
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of federal inmates reported that they never received personal visits from their 
minor children.117 Even maintaining contact with family by telephone is pro-
hibitive, as inmates must pay for their calls and call length is limited to fifteen 
minutes.118 
Although these effects are evident across racial and ethnic categories, the 
burden is disproportionately placed on black and Hispanic families.119 Black 
children are 7.5 times more likely to have a parent in prison than white chil-
dren, and Hispanic children are 2.7 times more likely to have a parent in prison 
than white children.120 This disparity is due in part to mandatory minimum 
sentences and Guideline policies that emphasized certain factors, such as crim-
inal history, which had a disproportionate effect on minority groups.121 
B. Case Review: Family Ties Departures in Federal Courts 
Courts have struggled to apply sentencing departures based on family ties 
and circumstances due to difficulty interpreting the Guidelines’ policy state-
ment, section 5H1.6, regarding family ties departures.122 The Guidelines indi-
                                                                                                                           
sentence.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/SW3S-D9YL] (discussing the planned move of FCI Danbury’s 
female inmate population and the already difficult reality of visiting parents in distant prisons). 
 117 See GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 97, at 18 app. tbl.10 (providing statistics for the fre-
quency of inmate contact with minor children). 
 118 See Stay in Touch, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/inmates/communications.jsp 
[http://perma.cc/TKM3-YRJP] (explaining telephone privileges for inmates); FED. BUREAU OF PRIS-
ONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT: INMATE TELEPHONE REGULATIONS 9 (2008), http://www.bop.gov/
policy/progstat/5264_008.pdf [http://perma.cc/GF4U-85AT] (noting that the maximum duration of 
phone calls is fifteen minutes). In addition, inmates are limited to 300 minutes of phone time each 
month, with an extra 100 minutes in November and December, which amounts to twenty fifteen-
minute phone calls in a typical month. See id. In 2004, 42.2% of federal inmates reported speaking to 
their children by telephone once a month or less. See GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 97, at 18 
app. tbl.10. Note that the author calculated this figure, 42.2%, with reference to Table 10. 
 119 See DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER? 178 (1993) (suggesting that the Guide-
lines emphasized certain factors that led to longer sentences of incarceration for blacks and Hispanics 
in comparison with whites); COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES, supra note 7, at 260 (recognizing 
the correlation between racial and ethnic disparities of prison populations and rates of parental incar-
ceration); WAKEFIELD & WILDEMAN, supra note 108, at 32 (stating that parental incarceration is 
unequally distributed among black and white children). 
 120 See COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES, supra note 7, at 260 (providing statistics regarding 
racial and ethnic disparities in prison populations). 
 121 PAUL J. HOFER ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SEN-
TENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING 
THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 117, 131 (2004) (discussing the various causes of racial dispari-
ty under the Guidelines). Prosecutorial discretion has also resulted in racial disparity due to decisions 
regarding which crimes to prosecute. See id. at 81; MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 137–39 
(1999) (describing the racial bias evinced by prosecutorial discretion). 
 122 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) 
(family ties policy statement); Berman, supra note 60, at 278 (stating that the extraordinary circum-
stance provision is difficult to interpret); Montgomery, supra note 63, at 37 (observing that by not 
defining extraordinary circumstances the Guidelines leave room for interpretation); Ilene H. Nagel & 
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cate that family ties are “not ordinarily relevant” to departure decisions.123 This 
leaves judges to determine what circumstances are extraordinary enough to 
pass the high bar of “not ordinarily relevant.”124 This interpretive disparity has 
persisted even after the U.S. Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory 
in 2005, in United States. v. Booker.125 Further, although in 2007, in Gall v. 
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that extraordinary circumstances 
was not the proper standard for departures, lower courts continue to apply this 
standard when considering family ties departures from the Guidelines.126 
                                                                                                                           
Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy 
Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 202 (1994) (arguing that judicial distinctions between ordinary and 
extraordinary family ties have been insufficient); Susan E. Ellingstad, Note, The Sentencing Guide-
lines: Downward Departures Based on a Defendant’s Extraordinary Family Ties and Responsibili-
ties, 76 MINN. L. REV. 957, 975 (1992) (noting that by leaving room for interpretation the Guidelines 
allow for unintended sentencing disparity). 
 123 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
Further, the Guidelines indicate that although departures may be appropriate in an “unusual case,” the 
Guidelines are intended to cover a “heartland” of typical cases in which departures are not necessary. 
See id. at ch. 1, pt. A. Several Circuit Court opinions remanded cases when district judges interpreted 
this to mean that family ties departures were prohibited regardless of the circumstances. See United 
States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 953 (1st Cir. 1993) (granting new sentencing proceedings because of 
the district court’s erroneous belief that it lacked legal authority to grant a family ties departure); Unit-
ed States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 83 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the district court could have exercised 
its discretion to depart for family ties); United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(stating that the district court thought it did not have the legal authority to depart based on family ties). 
 124 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENTENC-
ING COMM’N 2014) (stating generally that specific offender characteristics may be relevant in unusual 
cases); Karen R. Smith, United States v. Johnson: The Second Circuit Overcomes the Sentencing 
Guidelines’ Myopic View of “Not Ordinarily Relevant” Family Responsibilities of the Criminal Of-
fender, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 573, 610 (1993) (observing that the Sentencing Commission’s concept of 
ordinary family circumstances is “shrouded in mystery”). 
 125 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005); Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 
50, at 1681–82 (noting that evidence indicates judges have exercised their discretion in a limited way 
post-Booker). Some courts have held that the Guidelines’ limitation on considering family ties was 
never binding, or at the very least is no longer binding post-Booker. See Gall v. United States, 552 
U.S. 38, 47 (2007) (holding that extraordinary circumstances are not required to grant a departure); 
United States v. Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 49 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that, post-Booker, policy state-
ments are relevant but not decisive in determining whether to craft a sentence based on the circum-
stances presented); United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that policy 
statements were not binding well before Booker made the Guidelines advisory); see also Baron-Evans 
& Stith, supra note 50, at 1732 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions have indicated that policy 
statements are not binding on courts); Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, Offender Characteristics and 
Victim Vulnerability: The Differences Between Policy Statements and Guidelines, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 
3, 3 (1990) (arguing that courts should give less deference to policy statements than to Guidelines). 
 126 See United States v. Culbertson, 406 F. App’x 56, 58 (7th Cir. 2010) (hewing to the Guide-
lines’ limitation against considering family ties in all but extraordinary situations); United States v. 
Phimphangsy, 403 F. App’x 127, 130–31 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court’s decision to 
impose a Guideline sentence without departing because defendant’s circumstances were not extraor-
dinary and the Guidelines adequately considered those circumstances). 
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The Sentencing Commission revised the family ties and responsibilities 
policy statement, section 5H1.6, in 2003, adding an application note regarding 
departures based on the loss of caretaking or financial support.127 Although a 
step in the right direction, the four requirements outlined in this application 
demonstrate that the Commission continues to view family ties departures as 
exceptional.128 The Sentencing Commission has provided no additional guid-
ance to courts seeking interpretive assistance in applying family ties departures 
since the addition of the application note in 2003.129 
Subsection 1 reviews case law on family ties departures from the pre-
Booker era, from 1987 to 2004.130 Subsection 2 reviews case law on family ties 
departures since 2005.131 
1. Family Ties Departures: 1987–2004 
During the seventeen-year period in which the Guidelines were mandato-
ry, courts applied family ties departures with mixed results both within and 
across districts.132 Most courts refused to grant a family ties departure in the 
absence of extraordinary circumstances.133 In 1997, in United States v. Ar-
chuleta, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated a district court 
departure based solely on family ties.134 The Tenth Circuit held that even 
though the defendant was the sole caregiver to his two minor children and his 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. II (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2003) (explaining the addition of the new application note); THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FED. 
SENT. L. & PRAC. § 5H1.6 (2015) (discussing the new application note). 
 128 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014) (stating that, in addition to three other requirements, a defendant must show that the loss of 
caretaking support would cause more than the ordinary degree of harm that results from incarcera-
tion). It follows from this language, as well as language used regarding grounds for departures gener-
ally, that a defendant’s family ties and responsibilities are still held to an extraordinary standard. See 
id. (noting that departures should be granted in exceptional cases only). 
 129 See id. (indicating that section 5H1.6 was last revised in 2004). The 2004 revision was a re-
wording of a provision in section 5H1.6 that for certain crimes family ties are not relevant in deter-
mining a sentence. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. C (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2008). 
 130 See infra notes 132–142 and accompanying text. 
 131 See infra notes 143–153 and accompanying text. 
 132 See United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 1991) (referencing splits between 
and within circuits in regards to whether extraordinary circumstances are required for a family ties 
departure); KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 116 (1998) (discussing sentencing variation within districts); Berman, supra note 
60, at 276–77 (recognizing the inconsistency in sentences based on differing interpretations of ex-
traordinary circumstances); Ellingstad, supra note 122, at 969 (noting that at the time of writing at 
least three Circuits had internal variations in interpreting family ties and responsibilities under section 
5H1.6). 
 133 See United States v. Archuleta, 128 F.3d 1446, 1452 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cacho, 
951 F.2d 308, 311 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1446 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 134 See Archuleta, 128 F.3d at 1451–52. 
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elderly mother, his circumstances were not extraordinary within the meaning 
of section 5H1.6.135 Similarly, in 1990, in United States v. Goff, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned the defendant’s sentence because 
the district judge granted a family ties departure in order to protect the defend-
ant’s children, who were aged seven, six, and two.136 The court held that there 
was nothing unusual about the defendant’s circumstances and that a departure 
was therefore inappropriate.137 Finally, in 1992, in United States v. Cacho, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court had 
not erred in its refusal to grant the defendant, a mother of four minor children, 
a downward departure.138 The Eleventh Circuit held that district courts were 
not at liberty to depart downward for family ties unless extraordinary circum-
stances were present.139 
In contrast, in an often-cited 1992 case, United States v. Johnson, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a sentence that granted a sig-
nificant family ties departure.140 The defendant was the only caregiver to four 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See id. (holding that the circumstances did not pass the threshold of those unusual cases that 
merit a downward departure for extraordinary family circumstances). 
 136 See Goff, 907 F.2d at 1446 (4th Cir. 1990). The defendant played a minor role in a drug ring run 
by her boyfriend. See id. at 1443. The district court departed from a possible thirty-three- to forty-one-
month Guideline range sentence and instead sentenced the defendant to twenty-four months in prison. 
See id. at 1444. The district court was also moved to impose a lower sentence because the defendant’s 
children would be forced to move out of state to live with their elderly grandmother during the defend-
ant’s incarceration. See id. at 1446. The Fourth Circuit, following precedent from its own and other Cir-
cuits, as well as the then-mandatory Guidelines, determined that reducing the defendant’s sentence to 
protect her minor children was unwarranted. See id. (citing case law and section 5H1.6 to hold that a 
departure based on the defendant’s family circumstances was inappropriate). 
 137 See id. (citing United States v. Daly, 883 F.2d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 1989)) (stating that the de-
fendant’s circumstances are similar to any other defendant with children and that disruption in parent-
child relationships is a normal consequence of imprisonment). 
 138 See Cacho, 951 F.2d at 311 (affirming the lower court’s decision not to apply a downward 
departure due to family ties). As a matter of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit looked to precedent in 
the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits regarding family ties departures. See id. The defendant also re-
quested a downward departure due to her minor role in the offense, but the district court denied this 
request and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. See id. at 309. The defendant was charged with transporting 
cocaine from Haiti to the United States as a drug mule. See id. She was sentenced to six-and-a-half years 
in prison. See id. The sentencing judge noted that the Guidelines had reduced his ability to consider a 
downward departure for family ties, stating, “[P]rior to the time that the Sentencing Guidelines came 
into effect, this Court had the discretion to consider some of the equitable considerations that you have 
just alluded to. That has been taken away from the Court, rightly or wrongly.” See id. at 310 (quoting 
the district court record). 
 139 See id. at 311. 
 140 See Johnson, 964 F.2d at 125. The Second Circuit departed from a recommended prison sen-
tence to home detention. See id. at 126; Lerer, supra note 15, at 53–54 (discussing the United States v. 
Johnson case and the Second Circuit’s downward departure based on family ties); Wayne, supra note 
63, at 450 (noting that at the time of writing the Second Circuit was the only Circuit to issue a down-
ward departure where the only reason given for the departure was the defendant’s family ties). 
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minor children, one of whom was an infant.141 In comparing the district court’s 
sentence with the requirements of the Guidelines, the Second Circuit held that 
the defendant’s family circumstances were, in fact, extraordinary and should 
be accorded weight through a departure.142 
2. Family Ties Departures: 2005 to Present 
Interpretive disparity regarding when and how to apply family ties depar-
tures persists.143 One clear example comes from the opposing ways that two 
federal district courts treated two pregnant defendants.144 In 2013, in United 
States v. McMahill, the U.S District Court for the Western District of Pennsyl-
vania refused to reverse a sentence based on the defendant’s family ties.145 The 
court held that the defendant’s pregnancy was not an unusual circumstance so 
that a family ties departure was unwarranted.146 In contrast, in 2012, in United 
States v. Chamness, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Ken-
tucky affirmed a downward departure because the defendant was two months 
pregnant.147 Although the district court noted that the Guidelines discourage 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Johnson, 964 F.2d at 125 (affirming the district court’s sentence based on the defendant’s 
family circumstances). 
 142 See id. at 129 (holding that the number and age of the defendant’s children made her circum-
stances extraordinary). The Second Circuit added, “[W]e are reluctant to wreak extraordinary destruc-
tion on dependents who rely solely on the defendant for their upbringing.” Id. In addition, the Second 
Circuit held that courts are not required to give policy statements as much deference as the Guidelines 
and noted that the language regarding family ties in section 5H1.6 is a policy statement. See id. at 
127–28. The U.S. Supreme Court curtailed this practice in 2003, in Stinson v. United States, by hold-
ing that the Guidelines’ policy statements are binding authority. See 508 U.S. 36, 42 (1993). 
 143 See Abramowicz, supra note 108, at 818 (stating that federal circuits differ when interpreting 
extraordinary family circumstances). 
 144 See United States v. McMahill, No. 12-787, 2013 WL 2186981, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 
2013) (denying motion to vacate a sentence that did not grant a departure for defendant’s pregnancy); 
United States v. Chamness, No. 5:11-CR-00054-R, 2012 WL 3109494, at *7 (W.D. Ky. July 31, 
2012) (affirming a sentence that granted a departure for defendant’s pregnancy). 
 145 See McMahill, 2013 WL 2186981, at *6. The defendant was charged with mail fraud. See id. 
at *1. She filed a motion to vacate or correct her twenty-month sentence, arguing that her attorney had 
failed to inform the sentencing court of her pregnancy. See id. The government argued that the de-
fendant had told her attorney not to disclose her pregnancy and that the defendant herself could have 
brought her pregnancy to the attention of the sentencing judge if she wanted the judge to take her 
pregnancy into consideration. See id. at *6. 
 146 See id. at *4. Further, because the defendant became pregnant after her conviction, the court 
was reluctant to grant a departure because it might set an example for other female defendants that 
pregnancy is a viable method of gaining a reduced sentence. See id. 
 147 See Chamness, 2012 WL 3109494, at *7. The court granted a departure from the Guideline 
range of zero to six months of imprisonment to two years of probation. See id. The defendant was 
charged with animal cruelty under federal law because the acts of cruelty took place at Fort Campbell, 
Kentucky. See id. Given the nature of the charges, the sentencing judge expressed concern for the 
defendant’s well-being and ordered mental health counseling and parenting classes. See id. at *2. 
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consideration of family ties, the court held that judges are not prohibited from 
considering family ties.148 
Interpretive disparity is also evident in two post-Booker cases involving 
defendants who were caregivers to minor children. In 2011, in United States v. 
Vega, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a family 
ties departure, indicating concern for the defendant’s high degree of responsi-
bility for the children in her care.149 Yet in 2012, in United States v. Williams, 
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s refusal to grant a family ties departure for a similarly situated defendant 
who was the mother of five children.150 Instead of arguing for a family ties de-
parture under section 5H1.6 of the Guidelines, however, the defendant had ar-
gued that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) required the court to consider her family cir-
cumstances as one of her characteristics.151 The Sixth Circuit rejected this ar-
gument, noting that although § 3553(a)(1) allows such considerations, the 
                                                                                                                           
 148 See id. at *6. The district court indicated that a more serious penalty might have been appro-
priate, but it nonetheless held that the departure due to defendant’s pregnancy was not unreasonable. 
See id. at *7. The court’s decision reflects the appellate standard of review established by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 2007 in Gall v. United States. See id. at *2 (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). 
 149 See Statement of Reasons at 3, United States v. Vega, No. 1:09-cr-10315-NG (D. Mass. July 
25, 2011) (noting the defendant’s family responsibilities and reducing the sentence by applying a 
family ties departure). The Guidelines range called for a sixty-three- to seventy-eight-month sentence 
of incarceration. See id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2011) (providing the Guidelines table with sentencing ranges). Instead, the court reduced the 
sentence to time served and three years of supervised release. See Statement of Reasons, supra, at 3–4. 
The defendant was charged with conspiracy to possess and intent to sell cocaine. See Judgment in a 
Criminal Case at 1, United States v. Vega, No. 1:09-cr-10315-NG (D. Mass July 25, 2011). This was 
a first-time offense for the defendant. See Statement of Reasons, supra, at 3. The sentencing judge in 
United States v. Vega was the Honorable Nancy Gertner, an outspoken critic of the mandatory Guide-
lines. See id. at 1; Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 137, 140 (2006), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/what-yogi-berra-
teaches-about-post-booker-sentencing [http://perma.cc/P2T2-ANDR] (criticizing the mandatory 
Guidelines regime as overly restrictive). Judge Gertner has gone on record regarding her disfavor of 
the extraordinary family circumstances standard of section 5H1.6. See Gertner, supra, at 141; see also 
Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child’s Constitutional Right to the Family 
Relationship, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 98 (2011) (describing Judge Gertner as atypical 
due to her willingness to apply family ties departures). 
 150 See United States v. Williams, 505 F. App’x 426, 427 (6th Cir. 2012). Like the defendant in 
Vega, the defendant in United States v. Williams was a first-time offender and was charged with con-
spiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. See id.; Electronic Brief of the Defend-
ant/Appellant Debra Williams, Williams, 505 F. App’x 426 (No. 10-5028), 2012 WL 900850, at *9 
(discussing the defendant’s lack of a criminal record); Statement of Reasons, supra note 149, at 3 
(describing the defendant’s circumstances in Vega and giving reasons for downward departure); 
Judgment in a Criminal Case, supra note 149, at 1 (listing the charges against the defendant in Vega). 
The defendant in Williams faced a sentence within the Guidelines range of 188–235 months. See Wil-
liams, 505 F. App’x at 427 (listing the Guidelines range). The district court sentenced the defendant to 
the low end of the range, amounting to fifteen-and-a-half years. See id. The defendant appealed the 
sentence, arguing that the district court failed to consider her family circumstances. See id. at 428–29. 
 151 See id. at 429; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2012). 
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Guidelines limit these considerations to unusual circumstances.152 The Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that a family ties departure 
was unwarranted “because everybody has got family circumstances.”153 
C. Family Impact Assessments in Practice: San Francisco Set the Bar, 
States May Follow 
Because families of inmates experience a wide range of negative effects 
due to sentencing procedures that are blind to family impact, some jurisdic-
tions have begun to consider ways to mitigate those effects.154 For example, 
the City and County of San Francisco’s Adult Probation Department (“APD”) 
incorporated family impact assessments into the sentencing phase of criminal 
prosecutions to help mitigate the impact of incarceration on family mem-
bers.155 San Francisco adopted family impact assessments in 2009 and contin-
ues to rely on the assessments to evaluate how sentencing will impact a de-
fendant’s family.156 The APD prepares a family impact assessment as part of 
the presentence investigation report that is shared with the court during sen-
tencing.157 Family impact is one of many factors that APD staff evaluate in 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See Williams, 505 F. App’x at 429. 
 153 See id. (quoting the district court record). The Sixth Circuit held that the district court had 
adequately considered the defendant’s request before rejecting it. See id. 
 154 See Telephone Interview with Wendy Still, Chief Adult Prob. Officer, and Lee Anne Hudson, 
Div. Dir. of Investigations/Records and Reception, S.F. Adult Prob. Dep’t (Feb. 17 & 19, 2015) [here-
inafter SFAPD Interview] (discussing the benefits of using family impact assessments to reduce nega-
tive impacts to families of defendants when appropriate); H.B. 6660, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Ct. 2013) (a bill to add family impact assessments to presentence investigation reports). 
 155 See Dizerega, supra note 88, at 55 (discussing the Adult Probation Department (“APD”)’s use 
of family impact assessments). 
 156 See id. (noting that family impact assessments were added to the presentence investigation 
report in 2009); SFAPD Interview, supra note 154 (indicating that family impact assessments are still 
part of the APD’s presentence investigation reports). Chief Still notes the influence of the San Fran-
cisco Children of Incarcerated Parents (“SFCIP”) Children of Incarcerated Parents Bill of Rights, as 
well as her own experience in seeing firsthand the impact of parental incarceration on children. See 
SFAPD Interview, supra note 154; supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the SFCIP’s 
Children of Incarcerated Parents Bill of Rights). Chief Still observes that science has recently caught 
up with and supported that experience by documenting those impacts in research studies. See SFAPD 
Interview, supra note 154. 
 157 See Dizerega, supra note 88, at 55; Wendy S. Still, San Francisco Realignment: Raising the 
Bar for Criminal Justice in California, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 246, 247 (2013). Chief Still states that a 
research project is currently underway to determine how family impact assessments influence the 
sentences APD staff recommend in their presentence investigation reports. See SFAPD Interview, 
supra note 154. That research has already resulted in a plan to incorporate a written statement with 
each recommendation that will indicate how APD staff evaluated each relevant factor in the presen-
tence investigation report, including family impact, before arriving at a recommended sentence. See 
id. 
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order to set a recommended sentence.158 These assessments are used for de-
fendants in all criminal prosecutions, regardless of the charges against them.159 
San Francisco’s use of family impact assessments facilitates the creation 
of a holistic picture of each defendant as an individual whose sentence will 
impact a wide network of other individuals.160 In order to prepare a family im-
pact assessment, the APD gathers information relevant to the defendant’s fami-
ly circumstances.161 Information collected includes the number of the defend-
ant’s minor children, whether the defendant provides financial support to his or 
her children, whether the defendant is the primary caregiver, and whether the 
defendant lives with his or her children.162 
For the APD, family impact assessments are not just a matter of checking 
boxes on a form.163 The APD also initiated a shift in department culture to fo-
cus on the needs of the defendant, reflecting a family-focused mission.164 The 
APD designed this approach to both benefit defendants through reduced rates 
of recidivism and benefit the defendants’ families through the consideration of 
alternative sentencing and probation options.165 The APD’s use of family im-
pact assessments and the shift to family-focused policies and procedures has 
produced dramatic results.166 The APD’s caseload has dropped by forty-three 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See SFAPD Interview, supra note 154. Victim impact statements are also included in the 
presentence investigation report per California law. See id. In determining a recommended sentence, 
APD staff look at the totality of the circumstances as represented in the presentence investigation 
report. See id. 
 159 See id. Division Director Hudson notes that APD procedures prevent submitting a presentence 
investigation report to the court without a family impact assessment. See id. 
 160 See id. 
 161 See id. The APD reviewed research on the impact of incarceration on families, motivating 
factors for rehabilitation, resiliency factors, as well as the experience of APD staff to build a template 
for their family impact assessments. See id. 
 162 See New York Initiative for Children of Incarcerated Parents, supra note 73 (listing questions 
relevant in preparing San Francisco’s family impact assessment). 
 163 See SFAPD Interview, supra note 154. 
 164 See id. Chief Still indicates that the APD has “woven the thread of family-focused probation 
and supervision” throughout its department by revising its policies and practices to reflect that focus. 
See id.; see also Still, supra note 157, at 248 (discussing the department’s shift toward family-focused 
procedures). 
 165 See Dizerega, supra note 88, at 54 (observing that contact with family can reduce rates of 
recidivism); New York Initiative for Children of Incarcerated Parents, supra note 73 (discussing the 
possibility that a family impact assessment might result in alternatives to incarceration). 
 166 See Wendy Still, Improving Outcomes in the Era of Criminal Justice Realignment, CITY & 
COUNTY S.F. ADULT PROB. DEP’T (March 1, 2015), http://sfgov.org/adultprobation/sites/sf
gov.org.adultprobation/files/CJ%20Trends%20Fact%20Sheet.2.2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/GVZ4-
8NFW] (providing statistics and an overview of changes in the San Francisco criminal justice sys-
tem that took place between 2009 and early 2015); SFAPD Interview, supra note 154 (discussing 
the March 2015 report that documents the APD’s success since introducing these changes in 2009). 
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percent between 2009 and February 2015.167 Further, San Francisco saw a for-
ty percent decrease in its jail population during this time.168 
Although San Francisco is currently the only U.S. jurisdiction to use fam-
ily impact assessments, the State of Connecticut has considered adopting 
them.169 In 2014 Connecticut had pending legislation to incorporate family 
impact assessments into the sentencing stage of criminal prosecutions.170 When 
passed by the House in May 2013, the bill remained limited to custodial par-
ents of minors, but also enumerated the scope of impact such statements could 
address.171 For example, assessments might address the child’s financial needs, 
the relationship between parent and child, alternatives to a prison sentence, and 
whether family or community support would be available to the child.172 De-
spite passing in the House in 2013 and the Senate in 2014, the bill did not 
make it to a vote in both houses in a single session and was stalled.173 The bill 
was reintroduced in the House in January 2015 and was referred to the Joint 
Committee on the Judiciary for further review.174 
III. MOVING FAMILIES AND FEDERAL SENTENCING FORWARD: WHAT 
BOOKER BEGAN IS NOT YET COMPLETE 
Criminal defendants have a legal right to have their family responsibilities 
considered during federal sentencing.175 This right was granted by Congress 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See SFAPD Interview, supra note 154. 
 168 See id. This is all the more extraordinary given that, during this time, California was imple-
menting a “realignment” to redistribute state prisoners to county jails. See id.; see also OFFICE OF 
RESEARCH, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., REALIGNMENT REPORT 1 (2013) (discussing the effects 
of California’s Public Safety Realignment Act of 2011, including the transfer of some offenders from 
state prisons to county jails). 
 169 See H.B. 6660 (proposing to include family impact assessments at sentencing); Dizerega, 
supra note 88, at 54 (noting that San Francisco is the only jurisdiction to use family impact assess-
ments in the U.S.). In 2013 the San Francisco APD received the President’s Award from the American 
Probation and Parole Association for innovative practices. See SFAPD Interview, supra note 154. 
 170 See S.B. 361, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ct. 2014). The Office of Chief Public Defender 
first proposed this legislation for the 2013 legislative session. See CONN. DIV. OF PUB. DEF. SERV., 
THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER 57 (2012). The proposal began as a general 
request that courts consider family impact assessments during sentencing of custodial parents facing 
incarceration. See id. (describing the proposed bill). 
 171 See H.B. 6660. 
 172 See id. 
 173 See S.B. 361; H.B. 6660; E-mail from Anne Rajotte, Law Librarian, Conn. State Library, to 
author (Jan. 20, 2015, 09:59 EST) (on file with author) (describing the status and legislative history of 
both bills, as well as Connecticut legislative procedures regarding bills). 
 174 See H.B. 6479, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ct. 2015). The proposed bill would “require 
that a family impact statement be considered by the court prior to sentencing in any case in which a 
custodial parent will be incarcerated.” Id. 
 175 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012) (stating that courts must consider a defendant’s characteristics 
when setting a sentence); id. § 3661 (indicating that courts may consider any evidence regarding a 
defendant’s characteristics in order to determine an appropriate sentence); United States v. Booker, 
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and affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.176 Despite this, family ties departures 
under section 5H1.6 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) were 
cited in just 2.5% of all cases sentenced in 2014.177 Although a family ties de-
parture may not be appropriate in all cases, at a minimum courts should under-
stand and consider the family circumstances of each defendant.178 Depending 
on the facts of an individual defendant’s case and family life, this could result 
in a lower term of imprisonment or an alternative punishment such as proba-
tion or supervised release.179 
The past thirty years have clearly demonstrated that ignoring the impact 
of sentencing on defendants’ families creates collateral damage that affects 
millions of Americans.180 Efforts to prevent sentencing disparity through man-
datory Guidelines failed.181 Recognizing this, in 2005, in United States v. 
                                                                                                                           
543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005) (indicating that judges should use 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to set individual-
ized sentences). 
 176 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3661; Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46. 
 177 See USSC 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 95, at tbls.N, 25, 25A & 25B (providing 2014 sta-
tistics regarding downward departures that were requested by defendants and granted by courts). In 
light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, legal scholars and practitioners 
predicted that courts would use their renewed discretion to grant significantly more downward depar-
tures. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 107, at 48 (arguing that courts would increase the use of down-
ward departures for family ties post-Booker); Tofte, supra note 37, at 533–34 (observing that despite 
initial predictions of post-Booker increases in downward departures, as of 2012 the evidence indicates 
those predictions have not been borne out). Court-initiated downward departures (as opposed to gov-
ernment-requested downward departures) have increased from 5.2% in 2004 to 21.4% in 2014. See 
USSC 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 95, at tbl.N; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK 
tbl.26A [hereinafter USSC 2004 SOURCEBOOK]. Family ties accounted for departures in 0.45% of all 
cases sentenced in 2004 (pre-Booker) and over time increased to 2.5% in 2014. See USSC 2014 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 95, tbls.N, 25, 25A & 25B; USSC 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra, at tbls.25 & 
26A. Note that the author calculated these figures, 0.45% and 2.5%, by reference to these tables. 
 178 See Dizerega, supra note 88, at 55 (stating that family impact assessments give judges a holis-
tic view of defendants so that all factors relevant to their crime and characteristics are considered 
during sentencing). 
 179 See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 50, at 1662 (discussing the Sentencing Commission’s 
singular focus on imprisonment despite congressional directives to consider probation and other alter-
natives to imprisonment). 
 180 See Krupat, supra note 14, at 43 (arguing that children should not be dismissed as the collat-
eral damage of incarceration); Traum, supra note 107, at 468 (noting that the collateral impacts of 
incarceration affect others beyond the defendant). 
 181 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: CENTRAL QUESTIONS RE-
MAIN UNANSWERED 110 (1992) (finding that the Guidelines were unable to remove disparities caused 
by differences in gender, race, age, or location of sentencing); Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 50, at 
1682–83 (arguing that disparity increased under the mandatory Guidelines). Even if the Guidelines are 
revised to provide courts with more guidance regarding when and how to apply family ties departures, 
some might argue that family ties departures will continue to thwart the goal of uniformity in sentenc-
ing. See Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and Other Sex-
Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 
905, 933 (1993) (recognizing that family responsibilities used to calculate departures may cause sen-
tencing disparity); Shoenberg, supra note 38, at 295 (noting that those who are focused on avoiding 
disparity disagree with applying family ties departures). Most, however, have criticized the very goal 
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Booker, the U.S. Supreme Court returned to sentencing procedures that focus 
on defendants as individuals rather than plot points on a sentencing grid.182 
Although Booker was an important first step towards individualized sentences 
that account for a defendant’s family circumstances, additional reform is nec-
essary.183 
This Part argues that two changes to federal sentencing procedures will 
help courts evaluate and consider family circumstances during sentencing.184 
Section A recommends changing section 5H1.6 of the Guidelines to enable 
judges to consider family ties and grant departures based on a totality of the 
circumstances approach.185 Section B recommends amending Rule 32 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to incorporate family impact assessments 
in presentence investigation reports in order to help judges determine when 
family ties departures may be appropriate.186 
A. Setting a Reachable Standard for Family Ties: Recommended 
Amendments to Section 5H1.6 of the Guidelines 
In order to create a consistent method of assessing how a potential sen-
tence might impact a defendant’s family, the Sentencing Commission should 
issue revisions to section 5H1.6, the Guidelines’ policy statement on family 
                                                                                                                           
of uniformity in sentencing as an unattainable ideal that may limit rather than achieve justice. See AM. 
COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 37, at 35 (stating that the Guidelines placed the goal of uni-
formity above individualized sentencing); Adelman, supra note 65, at 2 (asserting that the goal of 
eliminating disparity is not workable); Ellingstad, supra note 122, at 957 (maintaining that sentencing 
uniformity is an unreachable goal due to the individual characteristics and nature of each crime and 
defendant). In fact, supporters of family impact evidence argue that by not considering this evidence 
courts are creating disparity among offenders by inflicting a “double punishment” on defendants with 
family responsibilities. See Nagel & Johnson, supra note 143, at 204 (describing punishments to sin-
gle mothers as a double punishment due to the potential to lose their parental rights); Smith, supra 
note 124, at 637 (asking if punishments are really the same when defendants with family responsibili-
ties face different consequences than defendants without). 
 182 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46 (holding that the Guidelines are only advisory and that courts 
should consider a defendant’s characteristics under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 
 183 See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 50, at 1632–35 (discussing the slow response to Booker 
and the challenges ahead); Juel, supra note 11, at 30 (noting that changes to federal sentencing proce-
dures since Booker should ensure that defendants receive individualized sentences); Shelley R. Sadin, 
Sentencing Individuals Under the Guidelines: The Vital Role of Background and Character Infor-
mation, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 316, 317 (1999) (calling for defense attorneys to remind courts to focus 
on defendants as individuals and avoid trying to impose identical sentences); William K. Sessions III, 
The Relevance of Offender Characteristics in a Guideline System, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1211, 1226 
(2014) (recommending that the Sentencing Commission continue to amend its policies on the rele-
vance of a defendant’s characteristics at sentencing). 
 184 See infra notes 175–218 and accompanying text. 
 185 See infra notes 187–199 and accompanying text. 
 186 See infra notes 200–218 and accompanying text. 
2015] Considering Family Responsibilities in Federal Sentencing 1531 
ties and responsibilities.187 The Guidelines are the starting point in the three-
step federal sentencing process, making revisions to the Guidelines a logical 
first step in providing a solid footing for judicial discretion regarding family 
ties.188 
Booker re-opened the door to the use of judicial discretion in applying the 
advisory Guidelines, yet the current “not ordinarily relevant” language of sec-
tion 5H1.6 gives judges little guidance in determining which circumstances 
make family ties and responsibilities a relevant consideration at sentencing.189 
Revising the Guidelines would resolve discrepancies in courts’ interpretations 
of extraordinary or unusual family ties.190 Because courts already consider 
many factors during sentencing, family ties could simply be one additional 
factor, though not a determinative one, in that totality consideration.191 Like 
the 2010 revisions to the Guidelines that allowed courts to consider character-
istics such as age and mental health, revisions to section 5H1.6 can simply in-
                                                                                                                           
 187 See Berman, supra note 60, at 278 (suggesting that the Sentencing Commission revise the 
Guidelines to provide a foundation for the consideration of family ties departures); Weinstein, supra 
note 16, at 169, 169 n.1 (describing section 5H1.6 and 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) as “so cruelly delusive as to 
make those who have to apply the guidelines to human beings, families, and the community want to 
weep.”). Federal sentencing should instead align with the approach used in 1992, in United States v. 
Johnson, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a family ties departure to 
the sole caregiver of four minor children. See 964 F.2d 124, 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1992). The Second 
Circuit assessed the facts of the case to determine that a downward departure was appropriate in order 
to mitigate harm to the defendant’s family. See id. at 129. 
 188 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2010) 
(reviewing the three-step sentencing procedure); Sessions, supra note 41, at 97 (describing the post-
Booker sentencing procedure as a three-step process). In a 2002 survey conducted when the Guide-
lines were still mandatory, district and circuit court judges indicated a desire to be able to consider 
many of the mitigating factors the Guidelines had banned. See LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD, U.S. SEN-
TENCING COMM’N, OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, FINAL REPORT: SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES 
ON THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, at B-8, D-8 (2003), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default
/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/surveys/200303-judge-survey/exec
sum.pdf [http://perma.cc/9MVJ-M9PH] (providing survey results indicating that district court and 
circuit judges wanted to see more emphasis on factors such as age, mental and emotional conditions, 
and family ties). Further, nearly 60% of both district and circuit court judges responded that the 
Guidelines should more strongly emphasize family ties. See id. 
 189 See Berman, supra note 60, at 278 (arguing that explicit guidance as to when family ties war-
rant a sentence reduction is needed); Wayne, supra note 63, at 453 (asserting that the Sentencing 
Commission should revise section 5H1.6 in order to give judges better guidance as to which family 
circumstances are relevant). 
 190 See United States v. Culbertson, 406 F. App’x 56, 58 (7th Cir. 2010) (following the Guide-
lines’ proscription against granting family ties departures unless the circumstances are extraordinary); 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014) (stating that specific offender characteristics may be relevant only in unusual cases and that the 
Guidelines should be applied in all but unusual cases). But see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 
(2007) (rejecting an appellate review standard that would require the presence of extraordinary cir-
cumstances in order for a reviewing court to affirm a district court’s departure from the Guidelines). 
 191 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3661 (requiring sentencing courts to consider a defendant’s charac-
teristics and requiring sentencing courts to consider any relevant evidence). 
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dicate that family ties “may be relevant in determining whether a departure is 
warranted.”192 
Revisions to section 5H1.6 should reflect the need to consider the impact 
of each sentence on a defendant’s family, in particular the impact on depend-
ents, whether children, spouses, parents, or others within the defendant’s 
care.193 Prior to their incarceration, over 60% of inmates were parents of mi-
nors; of those inmates, nearly 55% shared caregiving responsibilities for minor 
children and over 65% provided primary financial support to minor children.194 
When a parent is incarcerated, children experience significant trauma with 
consequences that range from behavioral and psychological conditions to poor 
school performance.195 Because so many families of inmates face these nega-
tive impacts both during and after the incarceration of a loved one, section 
5H1.6 should allow and encourage courts to consider these impacts during sen-
tencing.196 
Given that the Guidelines are still focused on determining sentences of im-
prisonment, revisions to section 5H1.6 should indicate that, in some circum-
stances, alternative sentences can and should be considered.197 These alternatives 
                                                                                                                           
 192 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014). 
 193 See Shoenberg, supra note 38, at 295 (arguing that district courts need guidance in setting 
sentences that will not cause additional harm to a defendant’s dependents). Using “dependents” rather 
than minor children keeps the language broad enough to encompass defendants who may be primary 
caregivers for mentally ill siblings or elderly parents. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 133, at 50–51 
(arguing that extending family ties departures to a defendant’s dependents ensures fairness to defend-
ants who have family responsibilities but do not have children). For example, some have suggested 
making downward departures for single parents and primary caregivers an explicit provision of sec-
tion 5H1.6. See Raeder, supra note 181, at 962 (stating that if section 5H1.6 is revised it must take 
into account downward departures for single parents as well as primary caregivers). As it stands, the 
application note regarding downward departures for primary caregivers and financial providers is too 
stringent. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014) (listing four requirements for these types of departures). Of course, given that remaining in the 
care of a defendant may in some cases cause harm to a dependent, the court should likewise have 
discretion to deny downward departures or seek alternate punishments. See Nagel & Johnson, supra 
note 143, at 208. 
 194 See GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 97, at 16 app. tbls.7 & 8, 17 app. tbl.9. 
 195 See Lerer, supra note 15, at 31 (describing parental incarceration as a form of childhood trau-
ma and describing the resulting mental health effects on children); Murray & Farrington, supra note 
109, at 135 (stating that poor school performance is one way that parental incarceration affects chil-
dren). 
 196 See COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES, supra note 7, at 6 (stating that incarceration caus-
es negative effects for former inmates and their families, such as reduced earnings for the family as a 
whole and behavioral problems among their children); Berman, supra note 60, at 278 (arguing that the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission should revise the Guidelines in order to allow courts to consider harms 
to third parties at sentencing). 
 197 See COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES, supra note 7, at 9 (recommending alternatives to 
imprisonment); Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 
1414–15 (2002) (recommending the use of alternatives to prison to avoid third-party harms); Wein-
stein, supra note 16, at 179–80 (describing the alternatives to imprisonment he has employed as Sen-
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include probation, home confinement, or work-release and weekend-only incar-
ceration.198 Such alternatives may provide a more efficient way of achieving the 
same result—punishment of an offender—without causing negative impacts on 
an offender’s family.199 In short, alternatives to incarceration can help keep a 
family together and still accomplish the goals of punishment.200 
B. Bringing Family Circumstances to Light: Adding Family Impact 
Assessments to Presentence Investigation Reports 
Once the Sentencing Commission amends section 5H1.6 to allow courts 
to consider family circumstances as a regular practice, further changes are 
needed in order to provide courts with the information they need to consider 
family ties departures.201 Incorporating a family impact assessment into the 
sentencing process would assist courts with this effort.202 There is already in-
frastructure in place to accommodate a family impact assessment: the presen-
tence investigation report.203 
As an element of the presentence investigation report, a family impact as-
sessment would become part of the sentencing record and would enable judges 
to better assess the totality of the circumstances surrounding the offense and 
offender before imposing a sentence.204 Judges would still be free to determine 
if they felt a departure was warranted.205 By including a family impact assess-
                                                                                                                           
ior U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, including restitution, house arrest, com-
munity service, probation, and home confinement). 
 198 See Brown, supra note 196, at 1415 (describing alternatives to incarceration). 
 199 See COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES, supra note 7, at 9, 22 (suggesting that alternatives 
to incarceration may be more effective and efficient than incarceration). Alternative punishments may 
be particularly suited to nonviolent offenders and offenders suffering from mental illness or substance 
abuse. See id. at 199. 
 200 See Weinstein, supra note 16, at 180 (arguing that alternatives to incarceration will help keep 
families intact). 
 201 See supra notes 187–199 and accompanying text; infra notes 202–218 and accompanying text. 
 202 See New York Initiative for Children of Incarcerated Parents, supra note 73 (maintaining that 
family impact assessments help courts make informed decisions about the family impact of sentenc-
ing). 
 203 See id. (noting that family impact assessments can be incorporated into presentence investiga-
tion reports); SFAPD Interview, supra note 154 (stating that family impact assessments are part of 
every presentence investigation report prepared by the Adult Probation Department). 
 204 See New York Initiative for Children of Incarcerated Parents, supra note 73 (observing that 
family impact assessments and the presentence investigation report can help judges choose an appro-
priate sentence); SFAPD Interview, supra note 154 (indicating that judges use the family impact as-
sessment alongside the presentence investigation report to evaluate the totality of the circumstances). 
 205 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (listing the many factors a court must consider at sentencing); FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 32(h) (noting that courts can depart from a sentence that is recommended in the presentence 
investigation report). 
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ment in a presentence investigation report, judges would have access to perti-
nent information to help them arrive at a just and fair sentence.206 
San Francisco’s family impact assessments should serve as a model for 
these revisions to Rule 32.207 The City and County of San Francisco has suc-
cessfully incorporated family impact assessments into their presentence inves-
tigation reports.208 These assessments include information about a defendant’s 
family and the impact a potential sentence might have on the family.209 Like 
the probation officers in San Francisco’s Adult Probation Department, federal 
probation officers are also in a unique position to gather this information.210 
When family impact assessments are incorporated into Rule 32 and the 
presentence investigation report, the instructions federal probation officers use 
to draft their reports must also be revised.211 These revisions would indicate 
the types of questions that probation officers should ask defendants and their 
families, and should also reflect the new section 5H1.6 Guideline policy state-
ment regarding the standard for granting family ties departures.212 
Probation officers could use some of the information they already collect 
to build these family impact assessments.213 Federal probation officers com-
plete a presentence investigation report worksheet in order to build their report, 
and this worksheet includes basic information about a defendant’s family 
members.214 In addition, probation officers are instructed to make a home visit 
during which they are expected to ask the defendant’s family questions related 
to their relationship with the defendant and the impact incarceration might 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See Dizerega, supra note 88, at 55 (recognizing that family impact assessments can help sen-
tencing courts by presenting a more holistic picture of a defendant). 
 207 See id. 
 208 See id. (describing the San Francisco Adult Probation Department’s use of family impact as-
sessments in presentence investigation reports). 
 209 See Still, supra note 157, at 247–48 (describing family impact assessments). 
 210 See P.S.I. REPORT, supra note 12, at I-1 (describing probation officers are “independent inves-
tigators” uniquely positioned to gather details about the defendant). 
 211 See id. at II-3 (describing the information about a defendant’s family as providing potential 
support for a departure). The instructions echo the Guidelines’ unworkable standard regarding offend-
er characteristics such as family ties: “In extraordinary cases, these factors may even be considered 
when determining whether a departure from the advisory guidelines or a sentencing variance is war-
ranted.” See id. (emphasis added); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6, ch. 5, 
pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
 212 See New York Initiative for Children of Incarcerated Parents, supra note 73 (providing a list 
of potential questions to build a family impact assessment template); see also supra notes 187–199 
and accompanying text (arguing for a revised standard for determining when a family ties departure is 
warranted under section 5H1.6). 
 213 See P.S.I. REPORT, supra note 12, at I-1 to I-2 (noting that the presentence investigation report 
is comprehensive and that all information relevant to the defendant’s history should be considered for 
inclusion in the report). 
 214 See U.S. DIST. COURT FED. PROB. SYS., WORKSHEET FOR PRESENTENCE REPORT 4–6 (2007) 
(including space for names and ages of a defendant’s children, spouse, parents, and siblings). 
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have on the family’s financial situation.215 Although questions asked during the 
presentence investigation are often designed to solicit information about 
whether the defendant might be able to pay restitution or find support from 
family during probation, these questions also would be useful in developing an 
impact assessment.216 
As an “independent investigator” for the court, the probation officer is in 
a unique position to gather and present facts that might assist a court in deter-
mining when a downward departure due to family ties is appropriate.217 With 
this in mind, defense attorneys have a duty to ensure that the probation officer 
has captured any facts that may be relevant to tailoring the sentence to the de-
fendant’s family circumstances.218 These additional facts will assist the proba-
tion officer in recommending a downward departure or alternative sentence, 
and can help the judge in determining what type and length of sentence is war-
ranted based on the facts of the case and the family ties and responsibilities of 
the defendant.219 
CONCLUSION 
In order to help combat the widespread negative impacts of incarceration 
on the families of inmates, federal sentencing procedures must take the needs 
of a defendant’s dependents into consideration. This can be accomplished by 
amending section 5H1.6 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to provide a less 
restrictive standard for allowing family ties departures, and by amending Rule 
32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to include family impact as-
sessments in presentence investigation reports. Defendants have a legal right to 
receive a sentence that is individualized and that takes their characteristics into 
account. Although a family ties departure may not be appropriate in every 
case, at a minimum, defendants and their families should be assured that feder-
al courts will consider family circumstances during sentencing. The long-term 
                                                                                                                           
 215 See P.S.I. REPORT, supra note 12, at II-16 (listing questions to ask during a home visit). 
 216 See id. at II-4 (referencing the utility of questions about family and financial support); New 
York Initiative for Children of Incarcerated Parents, supra note 73 (describing the types of questions 
that are relevant to conducting a family impact assessment). 
 217 See P.S.I. REPORT, supra note 12, at I-1 (describing the probation officer as an “independent 
investigator” and noting that they will receive information from all parties involved in sentencing); 
Smith, supra note 124, at 617 (stating that the probation officer has an important task in “ferreting 
out” facts to provide to the court). But see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 125, at 86–87 (arguing that 
probation officers often report facts presented by the defendant and prosecutor without independently 
investigating those facts). 
 218 See Smith, supra note 124, at 577 (stating that probation officers are hampered by the lack of 
clarity surrounding a working definition of extraordinary circumstances under section 5H1.6); Tofte, 
supra note 37, at 578 (noting that attorneys can now offer facts at sentencing to help their clients ar-
gue for downward departures). 
 219 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1)(E) (requiring inclusion of any facts that may be relevant to a 
departure from the calculated Guideline sentence). 
1536 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1501 
effects of incarceration are devastating to inmates, their families, and their 
communities. Federal sentencing procedures must empower courts to view the 
people who stand before them not just as defendants, but as fathers, mothers, 
partners, and caregivers. 
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